Page 65 - Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabi & Uman (1800-1870)

Masqat Taction, Badr began to see his dream for power gradually materializing.
He arrived at the capital at a critical time, while Qays was besieging the town
and refusing to negotiate with the regent and sons of Sultan upon any terms
short of the total surrender of all forts.446 Badr soon realized that the only
possible way to prevent the capitulation of Masqat and reverse the situation to
his advantage was to appeal to his powerful friends, the Su‘udls, for help.447
The latter were willing to facilitate the accession of Badr to power since he was
a follower of the reform movement. Hoping that he would use his influence in
making their doctrines prevail over others and in making the country more
attached to the Su‘udl state, and Su‘udls replied swiftly to his call. More than
once, their intervention frustrated Badr’s opponents and compelled them to
retreat. A contingent of Su‘ud! troops from al-Zahirah led by Hamad b. Nasir
al-Ghafiri of ‘Aynayn advanced through Wadi al-jizl to lay siege to suhar,
(Jays’ principal town. Their objective was to put intense pressure on Qays,
force him to abandon his ambitious designs, and drive him back to his original
principality.448 The action had its intended effect in that Qays was obliged to
withdraw his claims to sovereignty and relinquish Matrah, which he had
seized, but with Badr’s consent he retained al-Khaburah as an addition to
Suhar.449 Having accomplished the objective they set out with, the Su‘udi
forces left Suhar and returned to their centre in al-Zahirah.
Hostilities between these two rival factions of the A1 Bu Sa‘id did not fade
away however. Qays tried once again to oust Badr, and further Su‘udl
intervention was required to keep the latter in power. Taking advantage of
Badr’s departure on an expedition to Bandar ‘Abbas in order to re-establish
Masqati authority over Qishm island, Qays broke his agreement and advanced
to capture Masqat.450 On hearing the news, Badr returned hastily and upon
arriving found that Qays had already been able to plunder the environs and
that he was preparing to make an assault on Masqat itself. Badr resorted to his
usual tactics and sought Su‘udi aid. The Su‘udls promptly dispatched a large
force to Masqat by land as well as a fleet of fifteen vessels manned by 1,500
fighting men sailing from al-Bahrayn to Masqat on al-Dir‘iyah’s orders.451 The
result of this campaign was disastrous to Qays’ hopes; he found no alternative
but to purchase peace by surrendering every place under his control with the
exception of Suhar. The campaign also enabled Badr to force Muhammad,
brother and ally of Qays, to surrender the forts of Bahia and Nazwa in the
interior of ‘Uman.452 The Su‘udl forces again returned to their centres after the
contest had ended to Badr’s advantage.
Recognition of al-Dir‘Iyah’s symbolic supremacy over Masqat had been
admitted, although reluctantly, by the late Sultan b. Ahmad. This dated back
to 1803, when a Su‘udi political agency was first established in the town, and a
body of Najdi troops was stationed in Barka near Masqat. As an ambitious
personality who forcibly attained the Sultanate and engaged in internal tribal
wars to eliminate his adversaries, as well as external expeditions to restore lost
dependencies or add new territories to his realm, Sultan b. Ahmad regarded
the existing signs of Su‘udl influence in his country and the implication of
nominal submission to them as humiliating and degrading to his position. He
therefore lost no opportunity to seek ways and means of supporting the
Su‘udls’ enemies in the hope of ridding himself of their domination.453
Amir Su‘ud, like his father before him, considered himself a great Arab chief
and a supreme leader. His rule over certain regions was conducted more by his

61