Page 63 - Su'udi Relations with Eastern Arabi & Uman (1800-1870)
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For some time prior to his pilgrimage to Makkah in 1803, Sultan had been in
contact with the Turkish authorities in al-‘Iraq, hoping to work out an alliance
and prepare a joint expedition to curb the Su‘udi threat and drive them away
from eastern and southeastern Arabia.429 In the eyes of the ruler of Masqat, the
expedition would be successful in achieving such an objective if the combined
troops could attack the enemy on two fronts—the ‘Umanis from the central
part of the region concerned and the Turks from the north.430 Nourished by
such hopes and encouraged by promises of assistance and cooperation from
‘All Pasha, the wall of Baghdad (d. 1807), Sultan b. Ahmad sailed to al-Basrah
for dual purpose: to receive the annual gratuity awarded to the ruler of ‘Uman
in recognition of the services rendered to that city when it was besieged by the
Persians in 1755,431 and to ascertain the extent of the military preparations
being made by the pasha in accordance with his promises. 432
As soon as he arrived in al-Basrah in October 1804, Sultan began to lose hope
in the success of his plan. At al-Basrah he saw no trace of preparation, the pasha
was woefully behind schedule, and his soldiers were still behind the walls of
their barracks in Baghdad. Disappointed and angry, Sultan decided not to
meet the wall or even hold any further correspondence with him. He
nevertheless met with Ahmad Rizq, an Arab merchant and representative of
the wall, and through him Sultan conveyed his resentment at the lack of
progress and bad faith on the part of‘All Pasha.433 Sultan also threatened that
if the pasha failed to cooperate and fulfill his promise, then Sultan would join
the Su‘udls and become his implacable enemy.434
Masqat’s alliance with the Qawasim by sea and the Su‘udls by land would no
doubt be able to subjugate a great part of Turkish ‘Iraq, in which case the wall
would be the first to suffer. ‘All Pasha did not, however, take the menace
seriously.435 Judging from Sultan’s hostile conduct towards the Su‘udis, the
wall reckoned that such a drastic change in Masqat policy was far from
probable and, while he expresses his intention of waging war against the
Su‘udis in the future, ‘All Pasha refused for the moment to join Sultan in the
proposed expedition.436 Disgusted Sultan sailed back to Masqat. On his way
he was hailed by three boats belonging to the Qawasim, who were, as usual, at
war with Masqat. Sultan was killed during the contest which ensued; the
attackers plundered the vessel, but spared the lives of the crew and the ship
itself.437 It is unlikely that this attack had been planned by either the QasimI or
Su‘udi authorities; instead, the incident seems to have been but another of the
unexpected encounters between the warring maritime powers.
The death of Sultan b. Ahmad, in November 1804, and the confusion that
followed, provided an excellent opportunity for the Su‘udls to carry out their
final assault and occupation of Masqat. Their supremacy in al-Zahirah, the
coast of ‘Uman and in al-Bahrayn had been well established and would
facilitate the conquest of the remaining regions. Nevertheless, the Su‘udls
showed no sign of movement at such a critical moment.
It is doubtful that the Hijaz campaigns could have completely diverted the
Su‘udis’ efforts from the southeastern frontiers. The conformity of ‘Uthman
al-Mudayfl, a distant cousin of the sharif of Makkah, to the reformed doctrines
had a great effect on the balance of power there and contributed to the flocking
of the HijazI tribes to the side of the Su‘udis.438 Thus the restoration of
Makkah and the occupation of al-Madlnah two years later was conducted
largely by levies from the western areas. One therefore tends to believe that the
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