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IRAN’S CLAIM TO BAHRAIN 183
International practice furnishes many examples in support of this
argument. The most clear example, perhaps, is that of the former
Spanish colonies in South America which, after a successful revolution
against Spain, declared their independence in 1810. The United States
recognised the independence of the new States in 1822, and Great
Britain in 1824. The Spanish Government, which was making efforts
to suppress the revolution, protested against the American and the
British recognition of the new States. In its reply of 6 April 1822 to
the Spanish protest, the United States Government argued that it
yielded to an obligation of duty of the highest order, by recognising as
Independent States, Nations which, after deliberately asserting their right
to that character, have maintained and established it. . .
The recognition, it continued, was ‘the mere acknowledgement of
existing facts’.1 The British reply, dated 25 March 1825, to the Spanish
protest was based on the principle of State responsibility. Thus, in
support of her recognition of the South American States, Great
Britain held that the ‘Mother Country’ (Spain) could not, in her view,
have ‘continued responsible’ internationally ‘for acts over which it
could no longer exercise the shadow of a control’.2 Further examples
may be cited with regard to Greece, in 1827, and Belgium, in 1831,
whose independence was recognised in this manner (i.e., without the
consent of their Mother Countries). The independence of the United
States of America, and the recognition by France of that independence
in 1778, without the consent of Great Britain, furnishes another
demonstrative example.3
It can hardly be suggested that in all the cases cited above the
recognition by the Powers of the independence of those new States
was unlawful, and that, until the Mother Countries of those States
recognised their independence, they continued to be regarded, in
international law, under the sovereignty of their Mother Countries.
‘International law,’ says Lauterpacht, ‘does not condemn rebellion
or secession aiming at acquisition of independence.’4 However, it
requires for recognition by Powers of a new government, revolutionary
in origin, certain conditions which should be fulfilled by the new
government seeking recognition. These are the de facto existence of an
independent government exercising effective authority within a defined
area.5 In other words, there must be established a permanently stable
government. For it is held that any premature recognition as a new
State may be considered a violation of the rights of the mother State.
But it is equally held that a recognition too long delayed is not legally

1 Lauterpacht, pp. 12-25. * Ibid., p. 16.
3 Ibid., pp. 8-9; See also for more examples, Oppenheim, pp. 128-9.
4 Lauterpacht, p. 8.
6 Ibid., pp. 26-30; Brierly, pp. 129 et seq.