Page 250 - The Arabian Gulf States_Neat

188 THE LEGAL STATUS OF
THE ARABIAN GULF STATES
validity of the Persian claim to sovereignty in Bahrain was at that time
intended’.1
Let us now examine the Persian and the British interpretations of
Lord Clarendon's statement.
It is clear from the Persian interpretation of that statement that
Lord Clarendon’s recognition of Persia’s claim was not expressly
mentioned but was implied. Thus, a reference was made in the Persian
Note of protest of 22 November 1927 to the recognition by Lord
Clarendon of ‘the justice of the Persian protest’,2 and not of the
Persian claim outright. But it can be argued that if Lord Clarendon
admitted that Persia had protested in the past against the British
refusal to take notice of her ‘rights of sovereignty over Bahrain’ and
that the ‘British authorities’ considered that protest, this docs not
seem to imply recognition of Persia’s sovereignty over Bahrain, or
even the ‘justice of the Persian protest’.3 It merely means that the
British Government considered the Persian protest. If a reference be
made to the Duke of Argyll’s reply of 27 February 1869 to Lord
Clarendon about the Persian Protests, it will be observed that it was
never in the intention of Lord Clarendon, or the Duke of Argyll, who
advised the former on the question, to recognise the Persian claim.
Argyll’s reply, which formed the basis of Clarendon’s statement,
clearly stated that the British Government abstained from recognising
the Persian claim. But the Duke advised Lord Clarendon, if he
believed it to be more expedient to do so, to notify the Government of
the Shah, ‘as a matter of courtesy’, about other measures concerning
the conduct of the Shaikh and the peace of the Gulf.4
Thus, it can be maintained on the basis of this correspondence that
while any recognition of the Persian claim was out of the question, it
was the intention of Lord Clarendon to offer Persia a share of res­
ponsibility, with the British Government, in policing the Gulf.5 He
also offered to inform Persia, as a result of her accepting responsibility
in policing the Gulf with the British Government, of

any measures of coercion against himself which the conduct of the Sheikh
of Bahrein may have rendered necessary.
With regard to British engagements with the Shaikh, Clarendon con­
firmed that they were designed for that purpose (i.e., the maintenance
of peace in the Gulf). Those concessions made by Lord Clarendon to
1 For reference, see above, p. 177. See also The Times, 9 April 1957, where the
Persian Foreign Minister, Mr Ardalan, reiterates the same arguments based on
Lord Clarendon’s Note of 29 April 1869.
2 L.N.O.7., May 1928, p. 605.
3 Ibid 4 See above, p. 175.
* It"is maintained, with justification, that ‘the right to police the Gulf (which
was conceded by Britain) would not necessarily constitute recognition of its
[Persia’s] sovereignty over Bahrayn’. See Khadduri, op. cit., p. 635.