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SETTLEMENT OF BAHRAIN-IRAN DISPUTE 325

Gibraltar, it is understandable why the Spanish Representative was
at pains to draw the above distinction, preferring that the Security
Council should “confine itself to taking note of these conclusions 1i
of the report, rather than endorse them. However, the Spanish
Representative added that since all parties agreed and had no
“reservations" on the “conclusions" of the Secretary-General’s
report, his “delegation has no objection" either.1
Similarly, the French Representative, Mr. Morizet, (who was the
President of the Council), was of the view that the Bahraini case was
“a special case which cannot be considered as having established a
precedent".2 However, he appeared to be convinced that “what
was accomplished was within the spirit of the United Nations
Charter which requires that Member States seek a peaceful solution
to their disputes and provides that they may, under Article 33.
paragraph 1, use any peaceful means of their choice".3
In order to justify the “procedures" adopted in what he regarded
as a “special case", Mr. Morizet remarked:
“. . . there is no reason why one cannot depart from customary means,
and the solution has demonstrated imagination since the Council had the
final say in considering and approving the conclusions in the inquiry’’.4

The Pakistani Representative, Mr. Shahi, chose to discuss the
Secretary-General’s good offices mission in Bahrain from a

1. S/PV. 1536, op. cit., p. 36.
2. Ibid, p. 26. In connection with the right of the Secretary-General to appoint a
fact-finding mission, it is relevant to note the following comment by Edward
Gordon: “The Secretary-General's authority to appoint a fact-finding mission is
not explicity recited in the Charter. However, Article 99 confers upon him a
right to bring to the attention of the Security Council ’any matter which in his
opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security’. By
necessary implication, it is argued, this right carries with it broad discretion to
conduct inquiries and to engage in informal diplomatic activity with repect to
such matters. If the Bahrain mission may be said to afford a procedure under
Article 99, the office of the Secretary-General has scored a quiet triumph of
considerable proportion. See Edward Gordon, “Resolution of the Bahrain
Dispute", A.J.I.L., Vol. 65, No. 3. (July 1971), p. 561, at p. 566.
3. S/PV. 1536, op. cit., p. 67. Article 33 of the Charter, referred to above, provides
that the “parties to any dispute, the continuation of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agancies or arrangements, arrangements, or other
peaceful means of their choice". It is to be noted, in this connection, that Mr E.
Gordon (See his article in A.J.I.L., op. cit. p. 566, regards the “success" of the
Bahrain mission as a precedent more limited, if it is based “solely" on Article
33. But he does not seem to explain the reasons for this view.
4. S/PV. 1536. op. cit.