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consists of 7 or 8 Gallivats, 2 Ships, besides boats—the Ohaub’s fleet consisting
of 14 or 16 Gallivats, and the Oimus fleet of about a dozen more—The late
troubles have convinced us that these must bo destroyed before our trade to
and from this Gulph can have auy prospect of security—the Oarrack fleet has
a Ircady declared itself; the Chaub’s it is said is out with an intention of seizing
all Vessels it can mastor, and the Sheik of Bushiro is in daily expectation of
receiving orders from Carem Caun to prepare bis fleet for the same purposes—
when Oaplain Farmer was sout to Bushire by the Commodore, the Sheik ordered
his boat immediately off, otherwise ho threatened to detain her and her crew—
his excuse for this behaviour is, that he was afraid of some of Carem Caun's
people then at Bushire, and his civility afterwards to Captain Elphinstone of
the Bombay Grab, and his humane treatment of the Britannia’s people who
were sent to Bushire, seem to make this excuse of the Sheik’s a plausible one.
12. The Marine force for the purposes abovementioned should in our
humble opinions consist of a largo ship for battering with one or more of the
first and second rates, a Bomb Vessel, and about 10 or 12 of the small craft to run
after the Gallivats into 6hoal water—the land force of 500 Europeans at least,
a train of Artillery, and 1,500 to 2,000 sepoys—the Expedition ought to be
sudden; without stopping at Muscat, it ought immediately to proceed up the
Gulph, begin with the Ormus Gallivats and take or destroy every Gallivat that
belongs to the Persians whether an alliance with the Muscatters who have
been injured by Carem Caun, and assistance from them might not be of service,
and lighten the expenco to your Honors has been humbly submitted by us to
our Superiors consideration.
13. The proposals made by Hossein Caun of delivering us up Carrack,
and remaining there under us, in our opinions do not merit a serious consider­
ation—He has no means of subsistence but by piracy and would expect that
we would authorise and protect him in it, besides he has taken an extraordinary
method of gaining our friendship by seizing our Vessels with us too, it little
signifies whether his assertions with respect to Sheik Nassir being the sole
cause of the late hostilities be true or not—let who will have been the adviser, it
is very certain that Hossein Caun has been the executor of them, and it is
almost as certain that Carem Caun ordered him to commit them.
14. Your Honors we believe will agree with us that this is not a proper ouima agftliut
Season for making an application to the Chaub for the amount due by him on tho Kiih.
account the depredations committed on our trade, which was recommended to
us by our Superiors in their orders to us by the Resolution—before the late
troubles took place indeed, we were of opinion that such an application would
not have answered the end our Superiors proposed from it—demands in this
country unless supported by a respectable force, as we have formerly observed
to them, only serve to under the party who makes them contemptible—the
present Chaub is by all accounts as avaritious as the former ones, and will
never give up any part of what has been taken from us unless he is compelled
to do so—as a proof of this, the Turks have for a long time past bad a demand
on him from 20 to 30,000 Rupees, and th6 at peace with him, have not as
yet recovered a fluce from him—he has seemed for sometime past at peace
with us, and we thought it best to let him continue so—on an application for the
restitution of our property, he might be apt to imagine that we had still
thoughts of demanding it in another manner whenever we had it in our power,
he might therefore consider us as still at war with him, and might recommence
hostilities against our trade, because (from our inaotivity on his refusal of