Page 115 - The Persian Gulf Historical Summaries (1907-1953) Vol IV_Neat

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British trade; in doing so, they have no desire
to exclude the legitimate trade of any other
Power.”

It is abundantly clear from the passages quoted
that the vital issues involved in the maintenance
of British predominance in the Persian Gulf are
appreciated; hut, none the less, the recent
activity of the Germans in pushing their
interests in these regions has been so marked
that, there is reason, under existing conditions, to
fear a serious diminution of our influence—first
commercial, hut eventually political; and this
process cannot hut he accelerated if the Bagdad
Railway is completed under German auspices
alone. It would seem, accordingly, that the
moment has arrived when a policy of construc­
tive action might advantageously he substituted
for one which is defensive in character, and
practically limited to a declaration, urbi ct orbi,
that His Majesty’s Government will resist by
force any attempt, to establish a fortified base in
the Persian Gulf—a consummation which is
scarcely likely to arise, and which, since the
destruction of the Russian fleet and the conclu­
sion of the Anglo-Russian Convention, has passed
outside the rango of practical diplomacy.
Lord Lansdowne’s declaration of May 1903
was made primarily as a warning to Russia, who
was then suspected of harbouring designs upon
Charbar. It was also intended, though this
contingency was considered less likely to arise,
to prevent the construction of a fortified
terminus of the Bagdad Railway. It is, however,
practically certain that the Germans will not
stir up a hornet’s nest by doing precisely what
His Majesty's Government are publicly pledged
to resist. A policy of gradual commercial
absorption has far more to commend it, while, on
the other hand, it cannot give rise to legitimate
protests on the part of llis Majesty’s Govern­
ment. But the whole history of the Persian
Gulf, whether in the time of the Portuguese, the
Dutch, or the English, has shown that com­
mercial prosperity inevitably leads to political
hegemouy, and in these circumstances it is
matter for grave consideration whether, on
political grounds, exceptional measures should
not he takcu to facilitate. British enterprise in
the Persian Gulf, and to neutralize the etforts
being made to undermine our existing position.