Page 77 - The Persian Gulf Historical Summaries (1907-1953) Vol IV_Neat

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Ablins to Shiraz might prove financially advan­
tageous, while it would seem to offer no strategic
objections from the point of view of the dofcuce
of India. Such a line would absorb all tho
traffic which has hitherto passed from Bushiro
and Ahwaz to the north of Persia, and Mould
result in the material improvement of the port
of Bunder Abbas, now in the British sphere, and
greatly increase its value and importance. The
Concession might include the right to continue
the lino to Ahwaz or elseuhorc in Arabistun, and
to effect a junction with the Bagdud Railway—
such extension to be left to the discretion of the
conccssionnairc.
“An alternative scheme, which deserves
examination, is whether it Mould bo either
desirable or practicable to unite tho Indian
railway system with the Bagdad Railway.
“This scheme raises strategic considerations
which fall within the province of the Govern­
ment of India and the Committee of Imperial
Dcfcnco.
“It may well be thought expedient, for
strategic reasons, to oppose altogether the
progress of railway construction tou'&rds tho
Indian frontier. Bo this as it may, it would
appear that the difficulty of meeting German
competition in tho neutral zono in Persia is
likely to increase from year to year, and it may
prove that a raihvay such as that referred to
would, in British hands, be the most effective
means of anticipating a German commercial
advance into Southern Persia iu the future, thus
becoming the source of protection rather than of
weakness in the defence of India.
“ As to the economic aspects of tho scheme, it
may be regarded os likely that the existence of
6uch a line Mould make British co-operation in
the Bagdad Railway more u’clcomo to the
Germans, sinco it would increase the volume of
through traffic. While passengers u’ould hesitate
to travel by the Bagdad Railway with tho
necessity of breaking the journey on arrival ut
the Persian Gulf, tho convenience of a through
carriage from Calais to India could not fail to
make itself felt; further, tho economy of time
would bo considerable, and of especial value in
the transmission of mails.
“The objections of tho Russiau Government
might be such as to rcudor the enterprise in­
advisable, though these objections could not
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