Page 36 - Gulf Precis (III)_Neat

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Bombay, the steamer proceeded to 8ur, where their attempt to land was frusta t
ed by the Jonchoh boatmen refusing to take them in their hoats. When tl
to9scI arrived at Maskat, they refused to land at the place. The Sultan oslc *d
the Political Agent to surrender the men. His Highness could not specify anv
offence aguinst them except that they wore members of a tribe, recently iinnl*
catod in the rebellion and hostile to His Highness. The persons had not been
even present in Oman during tho rebellion. The Political Agent did not see
his way to comply with a request, so clearly against tho British laws of extra­
dition. The Political Agent offered to have the men searched, but the Sultan
did not wish this to ho done.
The Sultan thereupon addressed a K ha vita, dated 12th April to tho Viceroy
complaining against the action of the Political Agent, “as coutrary to the pro-
mises given to us by tho illustrious Government iu regard to tho usages1 of
friendship.”
73-B. The Government of India approved of tho action of the Political
Agent (No. 2559, dated 13th May 1855) and the Viceroy in a liharita of tho
same date explained to the 8ultan the true position and stated—
f‘ Under theso circumstances and in the absence of any specific charge against them it
would not hive been possible for tho Political Agent to surromler these persons t> Your High­
ness from a vesaal flyiug British oolours, or to enforce their detention in the manner suggested
by Your Highness. Such a course would have been opposed to British law and out-tom.'’
73-0. Sheikh Saleh bin Ali of the Harth tribe then addressed a letter, dated
16th May 1895, to Lieutenant Colonel
External A., July 1895, Nob, 51*63.
Jayaknr expressing the profound gratitude
of the tribe for the conduct of the British Government in not surrendering
their brethern to the Sultan.
(iv) Warning addressed to the leading Sheikhs of Oman against attacks on Maskat
and Mattrah.

74. The question was then considered as to the attitude to be adopted in
our relationship to Maskat for the future.
Secrat E„ July 1895. No». 336*357.
After considering the opinions of the
Resident and Political Agent, the Government of India in their despatch
No. 133 (Sec.—Ext,), dated 9th July, poiuted out to the Secretary of 8tate that
the authority of tho Sultan was limited and feeble, that future troubles were
anticipated, probably at au early date and that the protection of our important
interest in tho ooast towns of Maskat and Mattrali could not safely be left to
his unaided elforts. Three plans were suggested for securing the protection
of British interests. The first, which involved the annexation of Maskat and
Mattrah and the pensioning of the Sultan, was not advocated by the local
offioers.
With regard to the second proposal—the establishment of an exclusive,
British Protectorate—the Government of India stated that they adhered to the
views expressed by Lord Lansdowne’s Government; but they recognised that
Prance would almost certainly object to the establishment of a British Protec­
torate over Oman, and might demand for the abrogation of the Anglo-French
Declaration of the 10th March 1862—a price which would be more than the
Protectorate is worth. They did not therefore anticipate that Her Majesty’s
Government would think it prudent to open negotiations on the subject with
France at the present juncture.
The last course suggested, to which tine Government of India inclined,
was that advised by the Political Agent at Maskat, viz., that the leading Sheikhs
of Oman should be warned that, whatever differences they may have with
their Sultan, the Government of India would not permit attacks on Maskat
and Mattrah.
The Government of India considered this course the more desirable, because,
as long as they maintained a policy of strict non-intervention, disturbances
were likely to recur; and, unless we took steps to define our position, there was
risk of our becoming involved, however involuntarily, in discussions not only
with the Sultan and the tribes, but also with France.

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