Page 33 - Gulf Precis (III)_Neat

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through the heart of the town, consisting of very confined lanes, with closely pnekod buildings,
and fell at the outset, after the surprise, into tho hands of the rebels. Throughout the
struggle, extending over twenty-fivo days, tho greater part of tho town remained in possession
of the rebels, and this portion contained by far the larger number of our people's quarters,
which were thus absolutely at their mercy. There was at no timo any definite movement or
operation of the robels specifically threatening British property at any particular point which
was open to us to resist by force. Tho 6ca face exposed to naval attack consists, besidos the
Political Agency and houses of British traders, of the customs landing place and residences of
tho Sultan and his relatives. It is true that ono of the latter buildings occupied by the
enemy was a good deal battered by the fort guns, and could doubtless have been effectually
destroyed by firo from the ships. Hut I think it doubtful if this would have seriously affected
tho enemy, who could have easily retired a littlo back, and any general use of tho fire from
our 8 hips would have led to tho indiscriminate distraction of tho houses not only of British
Indian, but also of peaceful Arab subjocts, and to a probably extensive conflagration, besides
tho loss of innocent lives The only practically available course, in ray opinion, would have
boon, as above stated, to havo openly sided with the Sultan, directed and aided his operations
from tho forts, and generally supported and oo-operated with him.
4. Apart, however, from the foregoing considerations was tho fact that tho rebel leaders
had nt the outset not only professed tho utmost good will towards us and used their authority
in guarding our peoplo’s property but had also displayed a capacity for controlling their
followers and chocking license, which were highly creditable.
This control unfortunately did not survive the strain of the prolonged hostile occupation,
and perhaps also the efforts of tho leaders may have lator been somewhat relaxed. During
the third week there were many compluints of the plunder of tho property remaining in the
town, from British Indian traders who had on tho 18th February been removed from a position
of great peril to a place of refuge at one side of the harbour. The position I then considered
was such as to justify a demand on our part for a tbreo days' cessation of hostilities to admit
of meosurcs for the rescue of such goods as could bo removed. Tho tension became such as to
interfere with this truce towards its close, but much raerchandiso and goods were taken from
the town to a place of safety. After this it is to be feared that disorder rapidly increased
within the rebel position, and at the last moment reached a climax, for after the evacuation
not only were tho shops and stores generally found to have been plundered, but the town had
been Fet on fire in several places ; in fact pillage had only been limited by the inability to carry
of bulky goods such as rice aad grain, and to this had been added gross wanton mischief
and destruction.
5. For this, I venture to express my opinion, a reckoning should be exacted; the deplor­
able result, though not perhaps desired by the rebel Sheikhs, who may receive credit for
their exertions in restraining their followers during tho earlier days, is one for whioh they
and the tribesmen must, I consider, bo held absolutely and fully liable.
The principles directing our policy of non-intervention in the internal conflicts of Oman
and the considerations governing the question of our employment of forco, above dealt with,
could hardly be fully appreciated by tho Arab tribes who will bo more likely to misinterpret
our moderation, especially iu view of the presouco of two of Her Majesty's ships close to the
scene.
An impression that British property could with impunity bo oxposed to the rapacity of
lawless followers, as an incident in the pursuit of tribal ambitions or enmities would be most
unfortunate. Such a feeling would not only render a violent or ambitious Sheikh reckless
in embarking on such enterprises as the one now closed, but would obviously teud to make
the tribesmen more ready to follow bis lead iu the hope of plunder.
6 The conclusion based on the above views which I would submit for tho consideration
of Government i9 that tho principle of satisfaction should bo enforced agaiust those who have
violate! British property, and this not merely by way of a money compensation for loss, but
also io the form of punishment and example. Thus an indemnity might be demanded, and
be levied by a oess, apart from the ordinary duties, on tho produce exported from the tracts
peopled by the offending tribes. And unless Government be disposed to consider the question
of closer relations with Oman, carrying with them a more direct concern with its internal
affairs, and system of government by its ruler, action with regard to the indemnity, I venture
to suggest should take the form of a demand upon the Sultan. In such a case it would be
desirable that the fact of this reparation being the direct consequence of our demand should
be accentuated in the clearest manner possible to those affected.
7. The Sultan has not given me any clear intimation as to the measures which he proposes
to take in the matter of the injuries which British subjects have suffered. He has doubtless
had many pressing cares, and may not yet see his way very clearly. It would have been satis­
factory, however, if ho had enabled mo to communicate more fully to Government his own
6en60of his responsibilities in this connection and his proposals for meeting them. Yesterday
morning I paid a formal visit to His Highuess and offored my congratulations on his relief
from his recent troubles and my hope that his remaining difficulties might be surmounted.
The Sultan replied that what had happened was very serious, and that it behoved Government
to look into it; this wa*» a repetition of the remark he had made at my informal visit of the 13tb,
to wiiich 1 had not at the time paid particular attention. It is, as it stands, somewhat vague)
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