Page 29 - Gulf Precis (III)_Neat

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CHAPTER V.

British policy in regard to, and as a result of, the Maskat rebellion,
(i) The attitude of the British Government during the Maskat Rebellion.
01. The quoslion as to the attitude the British Government had to adopt
during the Maskat rebellion towards either
Secret K., July 1895, Not. 175-263.
of the parties was a very dolioatc one.
Our normal policy towards Maskat has always been—
(1) to abstain from mixing with dynastic disputes and to recognise the
defacto rulor accepted by the Arabs, and not to crop up oven a
de jure ruler, who could not hold his own without such support;
(2) to abstain from interference in inter-tribal feuds and wars;
(3) to prevont the disturbance of the maritime peace ; and
(4) to protect the British subjects and property.
52. The policy of non-intervention in case of dynastic disputes was depart­
ed from only in caso of Sayyid Turki; it was decided to give him activo sup­
port in repelling unprovoked aggression during his life time, but such support
was to bo given to hiiu especially and not to his children, heirs or succes­
sors.
63. This exception to the normal policy of Government being personal
to Sayyid Turki, the question was whether we would be justified in supporting
a ruler by force of arms, who was considered by a large number of his subjects
a failure. Major Saddler, who was Political Agent at the time and the Resi­
dent Colonel Wilson who arrived at Maskat on 14th February lb95 adopted an
attitude of strict neutrality, and decided only to see to the protection of the
British subjects and their property. A narrative of their proceedings will not
ho out of place here.
64. When the insurrection first broke out and the Sultan’s palace was
attacked early in the morning of 13th
Major Saddler to Colonel Wilioo, No. 6G-A , dated
18th March 1895. February, the Sultan’s wife and her
Ibid, No. 320. sister-in-law made tlioir way to the
agency over the roofs of Baniahs’ houses, and informed the Political Agent of
the attack on the palace and asked him to protoct the Sultan. Major Saddler
sent a message offering Ris Uighness the protection of the British Agency,
should he not he able to hold the palace, any show of force in that direction
being out of the question.
65. Ris Highness shortly afterwards arrived crossing over the intervening
houses. Major Saddler offered him and his family the protection of the Con­
sulate, in caso his position did not admit of any other resort. The Sultan
thanked the Political Agent for the offer, but as his forts still held out, he
proceeded with his family and attendants to Fort Jellali.
66. On the same day a warning was sent by Major Saddler to Sheikh
Abdullah that the rebels would be held responsible for all loss to British
subjects in life or property. Notices of nationality wero affixed to the doors of
the houses of British subjects. The British escort was called to the agency,
but owing to the suddenness of tho attack the treasure and valuables of British
subjects could not bo removed the agency building. At Matrah the Khoja9
withdrew to their fort and were given a British flag to hoist, while the Baniahs
shut themselves in their houses, affixing notices of nationality on the doors.
57. On the morning of the 14th February, the mail steamer of tho British
India Steam Navigation Company arrived at Maskat and was placed at the
agent’s disposal to be sent to Charbar with his telegram to the Resident. Before
tho departure of tho mail steamer, the Vazir oame with a message from His
Highness, to ask Major Saddler, if he would send the vessel to Sur to bring up
re-inforcement for His Highness. Major Saddlor rogretted that for several
reasons, he was unable to comply with their request. Apart from other consi­
derations, the fact that the persons and property of our subjects wero in the

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