Page 28 - Gulf Precis (III)_Neat

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47. Of tlio subsequent progress of the rebellion there is but little to record:
s desultory warfare extending over a period of some threo weeks ensued, carried
on by the opposing forces with varying success and interrupted only by a
truce of three days demanded by the Political Resident with a viow to enabling
British subjects, who complained that their shops were being looted, to remove
their property from the town. The fighting appeared to ho throughout of a
half-hearted character, and this was especially noticeable in the Sultan’s forces
who, although reinforced during tho war by strong dotacbmonts of the Boni-
Bu Ali, tho Bcni-Basib, and the. llislnn, and considerably outnumbering their
adversaries, made no determined clTort to expel the rebels and recover the capi­
tal for their sovereign. The evident apathy of his followers had eventually the
ofTcct of producing in tho mind of the Sultan a feeling of despair of achieving
success by their agency, and ho had recourse to other and more successful
means to bring tho war to a conclusion. Negotiations were oponod with
Sheikh Saleh, tho rebel leader, and on March 9th it was announced that peace
had been concluded. The town was evacuated the same evening by tho rebels
who 60t firo, as they left, to the Chora Bazar, and it subsequently transpired
that they had received some thousands of rupees as tho price of thoir retire­
ment.
(ii) Causes of the rebellion and its failure.
48. Major Saddler in bis letter No. 5G-A., dated 18th March 1895, assigned
the following causes to tho rebellion and
Secret E , Julj 1895, Noe. 17G-2G3.
its failure.
The cause of the rebellion may bo said to bo three:—
(1) Tho weakness of Sayyed Fey sal's rule and bis unfortunate policy of holding aloof
from the trib^B and allowing th»-ir quarrels either to adjust tbernsolves or to bo
settled by tho more powerful Sheikhs.
(2) The restless ambition of Sheikh Saleh, which, dormant for some years, had been
excitfd by the reception his eon and other Sheikhs of his tribe received at the
hands of the Sultan of Zanzibar during their vit.it to his capital last year.
(3) The comparatively defenceless state of the town against such a coup as that which
effected its capture.
The garrison was below its normal strength, and most of them were living outside the
walls. Against an open attack, however, Maskat could have held out till reliefs arrived des­
pite the 6moll number of its defenders.
The cautes of the failure of tho rebellion to effeot the declared object of its leaders were
also three:—
(1) The rapid rallying of the GhaBri tribes to the succour of their Sultan.
(2) The fact that tho movement had not the full support of the most important Hiuawi
tribes, who were not all devoted to Sheikh Saleh’s cause.
(8) Dissensions amongst Sheikh Saleh’s more particular adherents and an absence of
community of interests.
49. Among the causes of the rebellion might be mentioned the possible
connection of the Sultan of Zanzibar with the leaders of the insurrection, about
which see Chapter VI, paragraphs 92 et seq post.
(iii) Imprisonment and punishment by heavy fine of Sayyid Mahomed bin Azzan,
Vazir to the Sultan of Maskat, 1896.
60. The Sultan having received a number of letters from Zanzibar
written by his Yazir Sayyid Mahomed
External A., February 1897, No« 64>.
bin Azzan to Sheikh Saleh bin Ali and
others of His Highness* enemies, giving them certain information and advice of
a treasonable character, the Vazir was confronted with the letters and admitted
bis guilt. He was thereupon ordered to be thrown into custody until he paid a
fine of 20,000 dollars. The fine was paid on 9th December 1896 and the
Yazir was thereupon released.
60*A. Sayyid Said bin Mahomed succeeded him as Vazir.