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131. The above facts and proceedings were reported in brief by telegram
to the Secretary of Stnto and a request made that instructions might be issued
to tho Consuls at Cairo and Jeddah to watch any movement of Sheikh Fadhl or
his pcoplo (telegram dated 1st March)
132. Major Saddler in tho Brisk pro
Ibid. No. 328.
ceeded to Dhofar early in March.
133. On tho lGth March tho Residont telegraphed—* Saddler reports settle
ment Dhofar impossible without direct threat coercion.*
134. And oh tho 20th March ho telegraphed—* Sultan is willing to send
adequate reinforcements and suggested
No 322.
either sending his Military Commander, if
with assistance from us and on our conditions; or employing late Wali, if
unaided.*
135. In a dotailed report, dated the
Ibid, No. 320.
19th March 1890, Major 8addler explained
the position
The terms offered by the Sultan to the Katkeris were—
(а) Forgiveness for the past,
(б) Dismissal of Sheikh Suleiman and the appointment of a Wali of a
conciliatory disposition.
(<?) No more than tho customary 5 per cent, to bo levied in future.
(d) Grievances to receive prompt attention.
The Sultan intended to appoint his * brother,’ Seif-bin-Hamad, as Wali,
and Major Saddler apparently approved the selection.
135-A. Major Saddler’s interview with the rebel Sheikhs of Dhofar was
‘ most unsatisfactory,’ and the leading Sheikh maintained a ‘ defiant * attitude.
136. Major Saddler found the Turkish flag flying at Salala. He could
not collect any prior information as regards the supposed connection of the
Moplah outlaw with the rebellion. It was rumoured that the insurgents had
offered the province to the Sultan of Shehr and Makalla, but that he had
refused to have anything to do with a dependency of Maskat, that thenthey
had entered into correspondence with Sheikh Fad 111, who had written to say that
he would obtain the permission of the Porte for himself or his son to proceed to
Dhofar via Yeman after the Haj.
137. Major Saddler discussed the alternatives of letting the Sultan take his
own measures to regain his authority or of helping him to do so; and concluded
—‘ In any case, the retaking of the province and its occupation in force will
cost the Sultan money which he cannot afford and necessitate the employment
of men whom ho ought to keep for the defence at Maskat and Mattrah.*
138. On the 2nd April the Resident was told that, if the Sultan sent rein
forcements to Dhofar, his troops would, if
Ibid, No. 333.
necessary, be supported by the guns of the
Brisk; the telegram added —* Sultan should be told this help will be given
on understanding he will abido by our advice as to future arrangements in
Dhofar.’
189. This was based on the sanction given by the Secretary of State (tele
gram, dated 28th March 1896) to the
Hid, No. 326.
proposal of the Government of India, to
the advance of the Sultan’s forces, if reinforced by him, being supported by the
guns of the Brisk from the anchorage, if after 48 hours* notice the rebels did
not strike the flag.
140. The Sultan declined the aid.—Major Saddler reported—* The reason
. , .given. . . is that he refuses
Hid, No. 351 (paragraph 5).
to be bound to follow the advice of Gov
ernment with regard to future arrangements at Dhofar; whether this is his real
reason or whether it is simply put forward as an excuse in order to allow him
a free hand to employ his late Wali, Sheikh Suleiman-bin-Suweilim, it would
ho difficult to say. Both reasons appear to have operated to lead the Sultan to