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                      likely to incroase liie general difficulties or hampor restoration of his authority
                      throughout Dhofar pruvinco. On this ground Government counselled Sultan
                      last year to declare Sheikh Suleiman should mt return Dhofar. Terms
                      offered by Sultan to Kathiris last March wore judicious; and some such terms
                      will still apparently afford best basis of lasting settlement, which ah'Uild pro\ide,
                      first, forgivoti'8, suuject to full submission; second, appointment of Wali accept*
                      able to local Sheikhs; third, no new impost®.
               Offer of assistance, man-of-war,cannot be renewed without fresh roforenco to Her Majes­
            ty's Government. If it is asked for, report by telegraph.
                 Secondly.—As to loan—you may say Government have shown their willingness to help
                      him, but boforo proposals for furl her loan can bo entertained, Sultan must mani­
                      fest confidence in Government by fully explaining purpose f-*r which loan is
                      required, manner in which it will be utilised and his actual financial position.
                 Thirdly —As to indemnity—Sccretniy of Sla'o is averse to recovering from Zanzibar
                      subsidy any porti«n of sum due to British subjects. You may say Government
                      trust it will bo unnecessary to resort to such oxtromo measure, which they would
                      adopt with greatest reluctance. Further order as to indemnity will bo postponed
                      till you can report precise present position. Yon should state exaot terms of
                      contract given by Sultan and actual collections of last date season.
                 Fourthly.— Use your discreten aa to order in which Sultan should be approached on
                      above p unts and ;.m«iunt of pressure us' d, bearing constantly in miud import­
                      ance of maintaining influeuco over, and friendly relations with, him.
                145.  The question of lending the assistance of a man-of-war to the Sultan,
            and the extent to which such assistance could be utilized was a delicate one.
            The Government of India attached much importance to the exclusion of
            foreign encroachment from the Dhofar coast, and notwithstanding their avowed,
            policy of non-intervention in the internal affairs of Maskat, the Viceroy had
            obtained Her Majesty’s Government’s permission to support by the guns of our
            gunboats the advance of the Sultan’s troops. As reported in the Foreign Office
            letter, dated 19th June 1890, the Moplah outlay Sayyid Fadhl had been warned
            that he would not be permitted to proceed to Dhofar and that his Agent would
            nut be recognized there. But he was by no means satisfied with the communi­
                                           cation made to him ; on the contrary he
                Secret E., No> ember 1996, Noe. ’-4.
                                           questioned the authority of the British
            Government to prevent his proceeding to Dhofar. He remarked in a letter,
            dated 22nd August 1890, addressed to Mr. Herbert:—
               MI have never askt-d eithor for permission to proceed myself to Dhofar nor for official
            recognition of my envoy. For I am under no obligation t« ask of any Slate permission to go to
            Dhofar. There art Governments which recognize the official character of my state and function­
            aries, 1 have at Oho far a representative and officials, who carry on the government.n
                146.  Sheikh Fadhl and his sons were pensioners and title-holders under the
            Porte, and there could be little doubt as to the power by which the Sheikh was
            backed up or eucouraged in his designs against Dhofar. The attitude therefore
            adopted by the British Government of departing from their normal policy non­
            intervention in the internal affairs of Maskat was amply justified, in this case.
                147.  But the British Government had at the same time to take into account
            the French intrigues in Oman and their susceptibilities in the mattar of
            Maskat’s “independence," Their Vice-Consul M. Ottavi, it was evident, had
            now the ear of the Sultan, and spared no efforts for poisoning his mind with
            suspicions of the British motives. In Abdul Aziz, Dragoman of the French
            Consulate as well as a Munshi on the Sultan’s services, M. Ottavi found an able
            instrument to work his ends.
                148.  To the French Government a communication on the subject of our
                                           intentions was authorized to be made under
              Secret E., July 1806, Noe. 13G309 (No. 326).
                                           the directions of Lord Salisbury, coupled
            with an assurance that the action proposed in support of the Sultau’s authority
            implied no intention of csablishing any protectorate over Maskat (Secretary of
            State’s telegram, dated 28th March 1896).
                149.  In May 1896 the French Ambassador, Baron deCourcel called at
             Secret fc., June 1890, No*. 11-70.   the Foreign Office and complained against
                    (Noe. 17-18.)          the British Government sending their man-
            of-war to assist the Sultan in quelling the Dhofar rebellion and deprecated the
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