Page 133 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat
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                          Eslab lis/imen I of the A i'r- Rou lc
          This was a major breakthrough in the establishment o ic
        air-route, which began to function on i October 193^*   nc .
        its most significant aspects was the shape assumed by tic mpcria
        Airways rest-house: this, the first permanent British establisimen
        on the Coast, was a fort-like building, so providing a perpetua
        reminder of the true source of authority in the shaykhdom.
          After the success of his visit to Sharjah, Dickson was rcassurec
        by certain facts. First, he was convinced that Sultan s suspicions
        of the air-route were really based on a fear that closer British
        control of Sharjah would reveal the continued existence of the
        slave trade, which, according to Dickson, supplied 85 per cent
        of pearl divers; this fear also prompted the neighbouring shaykhdoms
        to oppose any extension of British interests. Dickson had not been
        impressed by the people of the Coast, and remarked that ‘it would
        be hard to find anywhere in Arabia a more uncouth suspicious
        and backward lot of Arabs’.32 Second, he came to the conclusion
        that there was no menace to the airport from the bedouin of
        the hinterland; the only possible danger there was that the ruler
        of a neighbouring shaykhdom might order his bedouin to fire a
        shot or two at the station merely to weaken Sultan’s position.
        ‘Such child’s game is not new to us ... and if ever such a
        thing happened, it would not be difficult to trace the guiding
        hand and inflict the necessary chastisement.’33
          With Dickson’s assurances that the security of the airport was
        in little danger, the Air Ministry and the India Office could confi­
        dently proceed to authorise the next step in the establishment of
        the civil route. An emergency landing ground was needed, and
        Kalba, situated on the Gulf of Oman, was chosen as the most
        suitable site. The headman of Kalba, Sa‘id bin Hamad al-Qasimi,
        was not as amenable as Sultan bin Saqr had been, and it took
        four years for him to give the required permission. During that
        lime, the classic methods of persuasion employed by the British
        authorities in the Gulf were put to the test: two different forms
        of threatened pressure were applied, and, when they failed to frighten
        Sa‘id into accepting an  agreement, Dickson’s written promise to
        Sultan bin Saqr was totally disregarded and the shaykh of Kalba
        was officially declared independent of Sharjah.
          The first approach to Sa‘id took place in September 1932, when
        the Political Agent in Muscat was authorised to sound him out
        on the subject of the landing ground. He found Sa‘id unwilling
        to discuss the matter before consulting with his fellow Qawasim,
        Sultan bin Saqr of Sharjah and Sultan bin Salim of Ras al-Khaimah,
        so the Agent left Kalba. A second mission to Kalba in January
        1933 a^so met with little success, so T. C. W. Fowle, who had
        succeeded Biscoc as Political Resident in 1932, devised a plan for
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