Page 135 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat

’’"It1"' nj H„ (/„,A 103
mb Emirates Establish mi’"1 <?/ l/l(’
lU ,\||||,(Ill’ll lie
Nii’iil ’’ Sl!sl,(,<,,n| Siilian bin Sali d“Ui0”' CO‘"liaC SZ
W’HIlsI (hr WKniiitf of an 1,1 (>1 havi ng infln cntral to British policy
'1 Kail >n in Inin tones: if an agreement, he wrote to tl e«cecl were always so c Resident Clerk at the was
in with, the
Kalba and aeroph, ne was forced thc Shaykh garucu. - - ... whether this ruling [of 1903]
received help, the not clear die
if, on the other hand, shaykh would t0 land a. argued that Shaykh of Sharjah’.40 Furthermore,
he be well rewarded; communicated to thc al-Khaimah from Sharjah
he called to task and proved to be obstructive, he would ever of Ras
considered personally responsible.31 This ultima- of thc independence kernative precedent. ‘If
linn was issued granting cited and used as an a
only after another, more devious, plan by Fowlc could be to recognise thc independence of Kalba
. ill,1 submission of Sa'id bad failed. In view of the great in 1921 to us
it is advantageous deterred by thc rather shadowy vestiges
,.umi,v between Kalba and Fujairah, and the Tact that the shaykh I doubt whether we need be had to be cleared before
e -tit elitimed all the territory around Kalba, including thc of Sharjah sovereignty.’41 One last point asked whether
independence could he sanctioned, and Fowle was
she proposed lor the landing ground, the Resident had sent the Sultan bin Saqr would ‘take umbrage’, and whether there was
Mi
hm* Am a chance that thc promises given by Dickson would be regarded
SAMS as broken.42 Fowlc’s answer was swift and forceful: ‘I do not think
it matters even if Shaykh of Sharjah takes umbrage.’43 The Resident
a message argued that if a ruler ceased to control an area under the de
facto rule of another shaykh, the former had to lose his claim;
oil A. Pcr*islcncc' tmpact on Sa‘id, also, that Kalba, situated on the Gulf of Oman, was not even
a means to subdue him, especially since both^he Forc'ign'office contiguous with Sharjah. Sultan s claim, therefore, had to be regarded .I!
and the Air Ministry had urged that no force be used ?0 obfam as extinct. I his being so, promise contained in Dickson’s letter
the concession. I he matter was therefore left in abeyance for three . . . does not apply.’44
years Fowle thus swept aside any hesitation that might have been
'p" "ir ^ i19?6 lhc subjecl was taken UP again with Sa‘id
1
by l orn Hickinbotham, Officiating Political Agent in Bahrain on felt regarding the promises to Sultan. An interdepartmental meeting
a visit to Kalba. This time Sa‘id stated his terms: he would sign was held in July at which the India Office, Foreign Office, Air
an agreement provided Kalba were declared independent of Sharjah, Ministry and Admiralty were represented; the conclusions reached
the 1 ulcr declared entitled to a gun salute, and assistance provided were in keeping with Fowle’s line o( thought, for the Departments
in the event of a serious attack.36 decided to sanction the independence of Kalba. Accordingly, Sa‘id
Fowle seized the opportunity to push through acceptance of the bin Hamad agreed to grant Imperial Airways an emergency landing
landing ground, and suggested that Sard’s terms be met. He saw ground in Kalba and signed an agreement to that effect on 28
no reason why Kalba should not be recognised as independent, August 1936.45 On the same day letters were exchanged between
Hickinbotham and Sa‘id bin Hamad regarding the new, independent
especially since the ruler of Sharjah had had little control over
it for many years.37 The India Office hesitated to break the promise status of Kalba,46 which then became the seventh Trucial state
and so remained until 1952, when it was reincorporated into Sharjah.
officially given by Dickson to Sultan bin Saqr in July 1932, which
Other concessions required by the establishment of the air-route
explicitly stated, ‘the British Government will respect you and
11 your successors’ independence, complete freedom and authority over involved less complicated and dramatic decisions, but were not
necessarily without problems. When, in 1930, Shaykh Shakhbut
your subjects and properties and will do nothing to take away
of Abu Dhabi refused to allow the RAF to keep at Sir Bani
your lands from you’.38 Any deviation from this promise would
Yas island a petrol tank that it had installed there without his
be nothing short of a bare-faced breach of it. But the advantages
permission, little attention was paid to his refusal, because of the
of proceeding with the establishment of the air-route far outweighe
1 general resistance on the Coast to the air-route; four years later,
any moral considerations, and the India Office began to rea lse
He was induced to accept the petrol tank, in exchange for the
the advantages of granting independence to Kalba; gradua y, | ^
granting or his request to have geologists search for artesian wells
arguments against it were put aside. Thc principal reason or m Abu Dhabi.47 Geologists would be sent to Abu Dhabi, but
reluctance of the India Office to grant Sa‘id’s wish for mdepende nee
on y 1 the necessary facilities—an emergency landing ground, a
was the precedent set in 1903 when the Government o mg-boat anchorage, and storage tanks—were accorded to the
recognised Kalba as a part of Sharjah.39 But the air-route was ’ °ng Wlth anV olher air facilities that might be needed.'*
and even precedents, which
F
essential to imperial communications,

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