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*4            The Origins of the United Arab Emirates

              of Sharjah asked that the compensation be paid in terms of diyah,
              the India Office decided to agree.27 There seemed no point in
              bargaining on an obscure detail of payment; the most important
              point was to impress the rulers with the seriousness of the situation.
              Furthermore, fear of intrigues by Socal on the Trucial Coast urged
              that negotiations get under way soon. By December 1936 Sharjah
              and Ras al-Khaimah had accepted the security clause,28 and in
  1           February 1937 Shaykh Rashid of Ajman followed suit.29
                Having agreed to compromise on the question of compensation,
              Fowle and the India Office were not prepared to go further, and
              wished to encourage the completion of concessions as soon as possible.
  i
              Although Shaykh Sa‘id of Dubai entered negotiations soon after
              signing the security clause, there was little sign that the others
              would to the same. By November 1936 it had become clear to
              Fowle and the Political Agent in Bahrain that, aware of possibly
              greater reward from Socal, the rulers were unwilling to commit
              themselves to Petroleum Concessions. Suspicion of the machinations
              of Socal continued despite the visit to the India Office in October
              193^ of Ballantyne (a representative of the Bahrain Petroleum Com­
              pany) on behalf of the California company. Ballantyne officially
              expressed Socal’s interest in the Trucial Coast. Although its represen­
              tatives had been approached by the various rulers there, Socal
              wanted first to inform the British Government of its intentions.30
              The India Office made it clear to Ballantyne that Petroleum Conces­
              sions had the priority on the coast, because of the D’Arcy options,
              and that the British Government could not approve of any approach
              to the rulers by a competitor.31
                The reasoning for this was clear. Although Petroleum Concessions
              was not owned exclusively by British interests, it operated as a
              British company in that its personnel, finances and outlook were
              British. In the absence of a fully British company, it served to
              exclude a completely foreign company. Socal was regarded with
              the greatest fear. Its concession in Saudi Arabia was assigned to
              the California Arabian Standard Oil Company (Casoc), which in
              1936 brought in the Texas Company (now Texaco) on an equal
              basis.32 Casoc’s concession in eastern Saudi Arabia raised the problem
              of the Saudi boundary with Qatar and Abu Dhabi. It was known
              that Casoc was seeking from Ibn Sa‘ud an extension of its concession
              so that it would cover the whole area that the king claimed in
              eastern Arabia; if this were granted before Petroleum Concessions
              established itself in Abu Dhabi, the fait accompli would ruin all
              hopes of negotiations over the boundary. Thus it was crucial that
              Petroleum Concessions should quickly negotiate concessions of its
             own—especially in view of  news  that the American company was
             resorting to subterfuge.
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