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»36            The Origins of the United Arab Emirates

               thereby contravening the conditions of his treaty with Britain. ‘Abdal­
               lah was impressed with the interest shown by the APOG and
               realised that it was a favourable time to strike a bargain: he
               informed Fowlc that he would grant a concession to the APOC
               if the British Government would in turn undertake to protect him
               against attack by land, support him in internal matters and recognise
               his son Hamad as his heir. His terms were accepted, in the face
               of I bn Sa‘ud’s and Socal’s interest in Qatar, and in May 1935
               an agreement to that effect was signed.44 On 17 May 1935, therefore,
               ‘Abdallah formally granted a concession to the APOC,45 which
               then transferred its rights, according to the Red Line Agreement,
               to the Iraq Petroleum Company. Shortly afterwards, Ibn Sa‘ud,
               who obviously did not know that an agreement had been concluded,
               wrote to ‘Abdallah warning him not to grant a concession until
               the boundary issue between them had been settled.
                 The letter, actually an unsealed mulhaq (supplement) attached
               to a formal sealed lcter, is a revealing document, confirming the
               existence of a private agreement between ‘Abdallah and the king,
               and disclosing the Saudi standpoint on the boundary issue.46 In
               it, the king made two oblique references to private arrangements
               obviously already in force between him and Shaykh ‘Abdallah,
               thus substantiating the latter’s declaration in 1930 that he had
               guaranteed his own protection by payment to the Wahhabi. Further­
               more, Ibn Sa‘ud explained that, although he considered the people
               of Oman and Qatar his rightful subjects, he had deferred to the
               wishes of the British by leaving the towns of those areas alone.
               He stressed, however, that this could not be the case for the hinter­
               land, which had to be governed by desert law, and at any rate
               was obviously not controlled by any of the coastal rulers. With
               specific reference to Saudi boundaries with Qatar, the king repudiated
               the validity of the Blue Line, on three grounds: that the Ottomans,
               during their occupation of Hasa, had never exercised extensive
               authority in the region; that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913
               had been signed after his occupation of Hasa; and that the Conven­
               tion was never ratified. Finally, he warned ‘Abdallah in no uncertain
               terms about the consequences of granting an oil concession before
               the boundary issue had been settled.
                 In the meantime, on 3 April 1935, Fu’ad Hamzah, Acting Foreign
               Minister of Saudi Arabia, put forward proposals for the course
              of the Saudi frontier with Qatar, the Trucial Coast, the sultanate
              of Muscat and the Protectorate of Aden; this proposed frontier
              became known as the Red Line or Fu’ad Line. Under these proposals,
              Saudi Arabia claimed Jabal Nakhsh and Khawr al-Udayd from
              Qatar.48 On 9 April, Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister in Jeddah,
              replied by proposing what became known as the Green Line; but
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