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»36 The Origins of the United Arab Emirates
thereby contravening the conditions of his treaty with Britain. ‘Abdal
lah was impressed with the interest shown by the APOG and
realised that it was a favourable time to strike a bargain: he
informed Fowlc that he would grant a concession to the APOC
if the British Government would in turn undertake to protect him
against attack by land, support him in internal matters and recognise
his son Hamad as his heir. His terms were accepted, in the face
of I bn Sa‘ud’s and Socal’s interest in Qatar, and in May 1935
an agreement to that effect was signed.44 On 17 May 1935, therefore,
‘Abdallah formally granted a concession to the APOC,45 which
then transferred its rights, according to the Red Line Agreement,
to the Iraq Petroleum Company. Shortly afterwards, Ibn Sa‘ud,
who obviously did not know that an agreement had been concluded,
wrote to ‘Abdallah warning him not to grant a concession until
the boundary issue between them had been settled.
The letter, actually an unsealed mulhaq (supplement) attached
to a formal sealed lcter, is a revealing document, confirming the
existence of a private agreement between ‘Abdallah and the king,
and disclosing the Saudi standpoint on the boundary issue.46 In
it, the king made two oblique references to private arrangements
obviously already in force between him and Shaykh ‘Abdallah,
thus substantiating the latter’s declaration in 1930 that he had
guaranteed his own protection by payment to the Wahhabi. Further
more, Ibn Sa‘ud explained that, although he considered the people
of Oman and Qatar his rightful subjects, he had deferred to the
wishes of the British by leaving the towns of those areas alone.
He stressed, however, that this could not be the case for the hinter
land, which had to be governed by desert law, and at any rate
was obviously not controlled by any of the coastal rulers. With
specific reference to Saudi boundaries with Qatar, the king repudiated
the validity of the Blue Line, on three grounds: that the Ottomans,
during their occupation of Hasa, had never exercised extensive
authority in the region; that the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913
had been signed after his occupation of Hasa; and that the Conven
tion was never ratified. Finally, he warned ‘Abdallah in no uncertain
terms about the consequences of granting an oil concession before
the boundary issue had been settled.
In the meantime, on 3 April 1935, Fu’ad Hamzah, Acting Foreign
Minister of Saudi Arabia, put forward proposals for the course
of the Saudi frontier with Qatar, the Trucial Coast, the sultanate
of Muscat and the Protectorate of Aden; this proposed frontier
became known as the Red Line or Fu’ad Line. Under these proposals,
Saudi Arabia claimed Jabal Nakhsh and Khawr al-Udayd from
Qatar.48 On 9 April, Sir Andrew Ryan, British Minister in Jeddah,
replied by proposing what became known as the Green Line; but
I