Page 173 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat

Territorial Claims; Saudi Arabia and Iran 139

the sultan, they would he unsuccessful; Weightman knew the impor­
tance of Shakhbut’s co-operation, especially in view of the ruler’s
excellent relations with the Al-bu-Shamis.58 After negotiations, Shakli-
but promised to make arrangements for another party of exploration
to proceed to Buraimi from Abu Dhabi,59 but he was resentful
that a party was to approach the oasis from another route and
under the auspices of the sultan of Muscat. Largely owing to
his anger, the expedition he had sanctioned was a failure, for
the movements of the party once it had reached Buraimi were
so restricted that it had to leave after only a short stay.
Howes, Assistant Political Agent at Bahrain, accompanied the
Petroleum Concessions geologists who took part in this expedition,
which was the first by Europeans to Buraimi since Cox had visited it
in 1905.60 His findings there were summarised as follows: ‘The
influence of Ibn Saud is practically nil, though he remains in
the back of people’s minds as a possible offset to Muscat, and
I have heard his name used for this purpose.’61 After receiving
the report of his assistant, the Political Agent in Bahrain commented,

Placing together information from various different sources62 I
think the hinterland outlook can be estimated briefly as follows:

(i) Abu Dhabi is the big power at the threshold. Shaikh Shakhbut
has a strong and apparently loyal Wali in his part of the Baraimi
Oasis, namely Ibrahim bin Uthman, for whom the Nairn and
Al-bu-Shamis Shaikhs seem to have considerable respect. Abu
Dhabi therefore wields the strongest influence in Baraimi and
much of Dhahira.
(ii) The Sultan of Muscat is recognized as quite an important
ruler—in his own place. Annual visits and fair words to him
are profitable, and serve as an insurance against the possible
closing of the Batineh Coast (not probable but possible only).
Otherwise the Sultan has no very great influence and any suggestion
of his suzerainty over the hinterland would be vigorously rejected.
(iii) Bin Saud is recognised as the really great man, and consider­
able care is exercised by the Shaikhs to keep on his right side.
Nevertheless he is a long way off, he is getting older ever)'
day, and I doubt if he is regarded as a serious menace to
their independence.63

But other considerations prompted the Foreign Office to press for
a compromise with Ibn Sa‘ud. These were the realisation of the
general decline of British interests in the Near East, in line with
the degenerating situation in Palestine, and the need, as war threa­
tened in Europe, for a powerful Arab ally. In 1937 the Cabinet