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Boundary Disputes: Chaos in Order 143

until more was known of the de facto position there, and that
the de facto tribal authorities in the hinterland had to be approached
through the de jure rulers from whom the company already held
concessions.4
When Fowlc was in London in October 1937> discussed his
plan with the Under-Secretary of State at the India Office, Sir
Find later Stewart. Stewart did not think it advisable to insist on
the de jure position, as this might, in the view of the League
of Nations, be committing the British Government to a number
of international obligations with regard to the interior (such as
to suppress slavery there). Instead he suggested that, where the
company required information about a particular tribe or shaykh,
the Government should advise it who was ‘the most likely person
to help’—that is, the reputed overlord. If the petty shaykh should
raise the question of his own rights relative to the possibility of
oil in the area, he should, Fowlc thought, be sidetracked with
the answer that the first thing to be established was whether there
were indeed any oil there. The company’s representatives would
be allowed inland only if the reputed overlord gave suitable guaran­
tees of safety, and any party would have to be accompanied by
a political officer. If oil were discovered in the hinterland, the
problem of boundaries would have to be dealt with later; if not,
the relationship between the minor shaykh and the overlord would
no longer be of importance to Britain.5
It is clear from this rather tentative formulation of policy that
Fowlc had little confidence in the Trucial shaykhs’ control of the
hinterland. He was not alone in this assessment. Clauson, Principal
of the Political Department of the India Office, reported, ‘Mr
Longrigg has expressed the view to me that we are wrong in
regarding the Trucial Sheikhs as being only seven in number,
and that eventually we shall have to get into direct relations with
more petty rulers in the hinterland.’6 Although they regarded such
an eventuality as most undesirable, the British political authorities
were willing to help the company as much as possible; and the
evolution of policy on inland boundaries proceeded along a very
nebulous path. The investigation by the Political Agent in Bahrain
of the de jure rights of the Trucial shaykhs was dropped. Instead,
each boundary problem and each question of the extent of tribal
control was treated individually and weighed according to the con­
cerns of the company. Thus no precise policy was attained. Fowle
expressed best the basic British attitudes in the matter of seeking
exploration rights: ‘Briefly that our dealings with a particular Shaikh
in order to secure exploration of a particular area by the Company
do not imply a recognition by us that this area belongs to the
Shaikh.’7