Page 90 - The Origins of the United Arab Emirates_Neat

G(i The Origins of I he United Arab Emirates
We have already seen how for some time Britain held off recognising
Sultan bin Salim as an independent ruler; it was not until 1921,
when this recognition was finally accorded, that Sultan’s status
was fully accepted in Ras al-Khaimah and on the rest of the
Coast. Of course, in this case the delay in British recognition was
owing to the secession of Ras al-Khaimah from Sharjah, but British
opposition to a new ruler in an established shaykhdom did occa-
sionally occur, thereby preventing that person from attaining power.
This happened in 1929, when the British refused to accept the
proclamation by the Dubai rnajlis that sought to make Maui* bin
Rashid ruler in place of Sa‘id bin Maktum. Although the British
were acting against their policy of non-interference, their move
strengthened the position of Sa‘id and for the moment eliminated
moves to depose him.
One of the adjuncts to recognition by the British Government
was the commitment to abide by the terms of all the treaties
with Britain approved by previous rulers. To show his willingness
to do so, the new ruler had to sign each of those treaties, thereby
promising to desist from the slave trade, the arms trade and maritime
warfare, and agreeing not to have any relations with other countries
except through the British Government. His power, therefore, was
remarkably limited in scope.
Because British policy was so uncertain and idiosyncratic, not
always conforming to the treaties (which were always binding on
the rulers), the management of relations with Britain was far from
easy. The ruler could not safely predict how the British would
react to a given question, basically because it often was difficult
for the British representatives themselves to know how London
or Delhi would choose to interpret policy. Moreover, British policy
in the Gulf was in a state of transition: what new courses of
action the increased importance of the Coast demanded had not
yet been fully decided.
In 1926, for example, when Saqr bin Zayid of Abu Dhabi was
obsessed by the fact that his dead brother’s sons would try to
avenge their father’s death, he appealed to the British authorities
to give him personal protection. The Political Resident, Sir Lionel
Haworth, to whom the appeal was made, was in favour of responding
to it and thereby deviating from the policy of non-interference.
Since Britain guaranteed to protect the shaykhdoms only from attack
by sea, this would be a radically new departure, as Haworth realised;
but he firmly believed that the British policy of abstention from
all but naval commitments should not be replaced by one of responsi­
bility for ensuring the orderly succession of rulers, their maintenance
in power, and the protection of shaykhdoms from attack by land.