Page 10 - Williams Foundation Integrated Force Design Seminar

Designing the Integrated Force: How to Define and Meet the Challenge?

To get where Force Design Division wants to go with regard to integrated force design remains they need to
engage in dialogue across the industrial and innovation ecosystem.

Design is about more than just platforms and systems…it is about how we design, acquire, operate and
sustain an integrated force in a more complex interconnected context.

And to achieve such a design approach a number of key attributes need to be incorporated into the evolving
approach:

• Force Design analysis of gaps and opportunities must consider the complete program design, including
new integration challenges
• The Stream view will drive deeper understanding of how critical these challenges are to the
warfighter in achieving joint effect sand reinforce the joint understanding of our gaps and
opportunities.
• Force options must be developed with integration and interoperability as part of the up front design.

The Perspectives of the Services on Forging an Integrated Force

The next group of military presentations represented the services and provided a realistic sense of what the
services wanted out of the joint design process. They provided a sense of the constraints within which joint
force design could occur, and the outcomes desired by the various services with regard to the joint effect.

But again, the Service Chiefs have already redesigned the way ahead for each of these services built solidly
on a joint perspective. What was in play in the presentations and discussions was not so much service
stovepipes or focus on joint integration at the service level, but how best to leverage each service’s core
competencies and how those competencies could support or be supported by the joint force, dependent on the
tasks or missions.

The Air Force perspective was provided by former Plan Jericho co-team lead, Air Commodore Chipman. In his
remarks to the Williams Foundation seminar on force integration, he argued that integration, as a goal was
laudable but not likely to happen as an abstract concept.

“I don’t believe that we share a common understanding about integration across the ADF or with our
international partners. We place too much emphasis on whole of system design, rather than prioritizing
integration efforts.”

He argued that integration would progress with clear focus on clear and realistic priorities. And working
organizationally to achieve core priorities would then open the pathway for accelerating real achievements
with regard to decisive integration efforts.

Leveraging networks, leveraging sensors, and off boarding strike are key aspects of integrative behavior but
sharing is not in and of itself integration. In many cases, collaboration is sufficient as the means to achieve the
joint effect, rather than a whole of system design.

“We need to integrate sufficiently to take advantage of networked capability. That is why network
taxonomy is so important in clarifying priority efforts to achieve greater capability to leverage networks and
deliver a joint effect.”

In the taxonomy, he highlighted that there are four levels of operational dynamics with regard to networks:
isolation, collaboration, cooperation and integration. In effect, arguing the best could be the enemy of the
good, Air Commodore Chipman argued that in many cases pursuit of collaboration or cooperation would
Second Line of Defense

Page 9