Page 6 - Williams Foundation Integrated Force Design Seminar

Designing the Integrated Force: How to Define and Meet the Challenge?

What was in evidence at the seminar was the initial results of the review in terms of shaping within DoD a
st
more integrated approach to the evolution of the 21 century combat force. It is obviously a work in
progress, but you don’t know what you don’t know.

If you do not set of the objective of trying to optimize combat capability and consider that shaping the joint
effect as a key means to doing so, then the challenge is clear: how to you get a strategic handle on where
your force is moving to and how do you ensure that it is as effective, lethal and sustainable as possible?

The Need for a Strategic Approach

Notably, each of the Service Chiefs has put in place on the service level a very clear programmatic focus on
developments in their domains with a growing regard to the joint effects. And these Service Chief commitments
have been in evidence in earlier Williams Foundation Seminars as well. Put in other terms, the Service Chiefs
are looking at the evolution of their capabilities from the perspective of how could they more effectively
leverage other services and how might they more effectively support other services, dependent on the mission
or tasks to be achieved.

Starting from that foundation, the next logical step is to try to gain a strategic handle on how the acquisition
and modernization of assets can be more effectively conducted with regard to their synergy with assets within
the joint force. And this effort is very synergistic in term with the evolution of the evolving warfighting
operational approaches and the concepts of operations, which are being developed to reshape the framing,
and execution of core tasks and missions.
There are a number of key factors or reasons why getting a better strategic grip on the evolution of the force
from a joint perspective is essential.

First, given the shift in focus to high intensity operations the need to maximize one’s combat effect compared
to the adversary is essential. A connected force can provide an advantage but only if it is synergistic and
survivable; otherwise it is vulnerable and can generate fratricide rather than destruction of the adversary’s
forces.

Second, the core enablers of combat power, such as C2 and ISR, are being dispersed throughout the services.
Creating a tower of Babylon is not the outcome you want to have.

Third, a number of the new platforms being acquired are software upgradeable. It is desirable to be able to
be able to manage tradeoffs among these platforms in terms of investments to get the best impact on the joint
force. It is also the case that getting the kind of transient advantage one wants from the software enabling
the combat force requires agility of the sort that will come with applications on top of middleware on top of
an open architecture system.

Fourth, much of the force, which will be operating in 2030, is already here. This means that there will be
considerable adaptation of the platforms towards greater joint effect. How to ensure that the legacy
modernization programs provide effective joint effects, rather than simply stovepiped upgrades?

Fifth, the information and communication systems, which are the enablers for the joint force, are dynamic
elements subject to market change and adversary disruptions. How to best develop IT and Coms packages
which can support cross-cutting modernization and evolving force integration?

Second Line of Defense

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