Page 55 - Williams Foundation Integrated Force Design Seminar

Designing the Integrated Force: How to Define and Meet the Challenge?

“They’re wicked problems which require finding the best way to manage the problem going forward rather
than tactically solving it in a narrow sense.”

As I had met earlier at the base with the Wing Commander who commands the Super Hornet/Growler
squadrons, we naturally discussed the coming of Growler into the force from the warfighting rather than
platform specific perspective.

Roberton argued, “we bought Growler less because we wanted an electronic warfare platform than we
wanted to get into a mindset and working relationship with the US which would translate into other platforms
as well.

“We need to learn and expand into the broad non-kinetic warfighting area and acquiring Growler is a
means to that end; it is not about simply operating an EW platform.
“It is about shaping a network of operators who can be informed by, and inform others in the ADF, how to
broaden our non-kinetic warfighting skill sets.”

It is about generational and cultural change.

“By the mid-2020s we want to have leadership across the ADF that does not think in or stay in their tactical
stove pipes.
“They need to think kill web as a foundational approach to everything they do.

“This is the only way a small country like ours can deal with the defense and security problems we face.

“We can not afford stove pipes.”

Finally, we discussed the innovative approach that the Air Combat Group is taking to enhance the ability to
train pilots more effectively so that the proficiency levels remain high but that more pilots are graduated than
previously.

How do you reduce the attrition rate in the training programs without reducing standards?

Or how to ramp up the pass rate of pilots to get better value out of the significant investments put into the
pilot training programs?

At the end of this article, I have included two press releases issued in late 2016 by Air Combat Group, which
explain more fully the “re-role program for fast jet pilots.”

“We are simply not getting enough pilots through the training program, and we have looked hard at how we
have done the training and have found that we can shift the training program to do a much better job of pilot
training and retention.

“We have historically had a very rigid set of performance standards but by building a performance based
system drawing upon principles of sports coaching we are graduating more qualified pilots than before.”

Pilot training is very expensive and traditionally the RAAF would take about 20% of the graduates of basic
pilot training on to a track to be trained as fast jet pilots.

And traditionally, they would pass 50 to 60% of those pilots into fast jets.

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