Page 46 - F-35B and USMC
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The Integration of the F-35B into USMC Operations

            A clear focus is upon shaping integrated combat capability, and getting the Navy and Marine Corps back to
            their amphibious roots after a dozen or more years of less-traditional deployments. “We need to understand
            each other’s planning processes, capabilities, limitations, the type of missions they might get assigned and
            ways to work up joint taskings.”

            With the impact of the Osprey and now the coming of the F-35B, the amphibious task force is much more than
            a transportation asset, and as such, joint operation capabilities need to be forged, shaped and transformed
            going forward.

            With the refocusing efforts in tandem with platforms like the Osprey and F-35B, the Navy is shifting from a
            strictly transport force from point A to B to becoming an expeditionary tactical strike and power projection
            asset as part of the national security equation.

            When I asked her about that, Thebaud acknowledged that she sees such an evolution as having an impact on
            the evolution of the Navy overall.

            “We already have 80% of the ships and other major equipment we’ll have 20 years from now. The key is to
            evolve its capability and to draw upon the new systems to shape a more effective combat force,” she said.
            The evolution of amphibious capabilities will allow the rest of the surface fleet, and the aircraft carriers
            to evolve as well.

            An important aspect of the joint capability, which a dynamically evolving and integrated Navy-Marine Corps
            capability brings to the fight, is to support what we have called force insertion.

            One can come to an area of interest, execute the mission with organic logistics support, and then leave
            without providing logistics support ashore for possible adversarial use.

            When I asked Thebaud about her own experiences along those lines, she noted, “if we look back at the
            Operation Damayan Philippines relief effort, we brought capability to the crisis to support the relief effort.
            We stayed as long as necessary and then left.
            We came, did the things that needed to get done that were uniquely military to provide the initial response
            and stabilize the situation, enabled the NGOs and the other organizations to come in that have the intrinsic
            capabilities to do it over the long haul, and then we left.

            While granted, this wasn’t a combat operation, the end result was mission accomplished, with minimal residual
            military footprint left behind.”

            Capt. McMillan’s recent operational experience provided many examples of the evolving capabilities of
            the Amphibious Ready Group and challenges to be met in enhancing its capability to deliver joint effect.

            As McMillan put it, “We felt that what we did during the operation was unique, but I think that over time, our
            ‘unique and unusual’ will become the norm.”
            He added, “Put another way, our unique joint capabilities as a Navy-Marine Corps force can be mixed or
            matched to deal with a variety of tasks in the battlespace, and that flexibility is probably becoming the
            norm as a requirement, and we are looking to enhance that flexibility going forward.”

            Normally, the Navy is supporting the Marines in sustaining their air and ground combat force readiness and
            operations; the Amphibious Ready Group is supporting the Marine Expeditionary Unit. But with the crisis in


            Second Line of Defense


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