Page 47 - F-35B and USMC

The Integration of the F-35B into USMC Operations

Yemen, there was immediate need for maritime security, sea control and the ability to monitor the situation off
of the coast of Yemen and in surrounding waters.

McMillan noted that during his deployment, “The Marines supported the Navy by providing air assets to build
the recognized maritime picture, conduct presence ops and non-traditional ISR .

We shaped packages consisting of a mix of the Air Combat Element aircraft to conduct sea control and
maritime security missions. In addition, we moved aircraft throughout shipping to enhance flexibility and
effectiveness.

For instance, the combination of 3 MV-22s with 3 new Hueys provided the LPD excellent capability for the
missions of Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP), Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC), Quick
Reaction Force (QRF) and Rotary-Wing Close Air Support (CAS.).
These flexible packages provided capability, which historically would have only been on the large deck
carrier (LHD/LHA), albeit on a smaller scale.

But we were able to provide the 5th Fleet commander with essential core capabilities.”

This kind of joint capability can be missed if one simply subsumes this under a notion of historical or classic
amphibious operations. And the fleet was able to contribute significant command and control for the force as
well.

Notably, the upgrades on the San Antonio-class LPDs provide an added option for command and control
not seen historically in the amphibious fleet.

Indeed, in the most recent BALTOPS exercise this summer, USS San Antonio was the flagship for the multi-
national exercise, with three Flag officers and elements of their staffs embarked.

But this capability needs to be enhanced throughout the amphibious fleet and Captain McMillian argued that
organic ISR and better C2 capabilities need to come to the LSD and the follow on LXR (LSD Replacement)
class ships as well.

Another challenge is taking an increasingly capable force, breaking up the assets and chopping them to
different command elements.

This is clearly happening with regard to assets such as the Ospreys within the task force, whereby the
Combatant Commanders are moving organic assets from the task force and using these assets directly
themselves.
The demand side drivers are creating disruptive pressures for the unity of command and control crucial for the
combat effectiveness of the ARG-MEU or the amphibious task force.

The triple dynamics of a significant demand signal for forces, coupled with the evolving flexibility of the
amphibious forces as joint capabilities, with the shortage of numbers of relevant naval assets overall is
almost certainly going to lead to commanders tapping into the amphibious fleet and leveraging its
assets.

This is challenging for amphibious commanders.

It is the combination of the price of success at evolving capabilities, flexibility in shaping the tool sets, and the
cost of shortfalls in other areas of maritime capabilities.

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