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North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return
At first, radar guided missiles needed continuous guidance from the fighter but eventually even radar guided
missiles became BVR self-contained “fire and forget.”
So unlike WWII research and development, where research on airframes and engines was the mantra, in the
jet age there were two other huge design factors at work.
The first was always questing to improve the radar systems in the fighters and, secondly, as technology
allowed independent designs could improve the weapons carried.
Yet again, the art of aeronautical design had to work in partnership with the science of military R&D.
Along the way survivability shifted from armor, speed, and focusing on a good canopy into the era of
Electronic Warfare and now the incorporation of stealth characteristics through both design considerations,
composite materials and the wonders of chemistry for paint.
Stealth is a survivability factor and is critically important because it multiplies the effectiveness of the
fighter—one doesn’t add stealth but incorporates it into the very existence of the fighter.
Being a multiplying factor means it is sensitive and can really drive the entire performance of the airframe
and system combat performance.
So ending the 20th Century the complexities of fielding the best fighter was a much bigger challenge because
of three synergistic but independent factors–basic airframe performance improvements, internal system R&D
and constantly improving weapons.
Like John Boyd using his F-86 experience to formulate the OODA loop, the F-35 can be the starting point for
understanding the unifying and driving force of Payload Utility added to OODA loop thinking.
The XXIst Century Man-Machine Revolution: A New Distributed
Information Capability and a Potential Spiral Development Design Process
With the very real computer revolution moving with light speed into the 21st Century there is now a fourth
design dynamic at work —the man-machine interface.
Three-dimensional sensing and being able to distribute information to other warfighters, airborne and on the
ground or at sea, the relationship of the individual pilot to knowledge of the bigger air battle is truly
revolutionary.
This is brand new and will provide a foundation for further developments in the payload-utility domain.
For example, one of the most important capabilities of the F-35 is the distributed information capability.
The least experienced fighter pilot to the most experienced, all flying into the air battle in yet to be
developed formations are all equally capable of having the same knowledge and situational awareness.
Consequently, in the formation if one pilot gets inside the opponents OODA loop (observe orient decide act)
all are capable of having that same joint knowledge.
Second Line of Defense
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