Page 42 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

The Council approved the new text on December 19 and President Vladimir Putin signed it one week later.

In its press release announcing the new doctrine, the Council highlighted these new threats (which cover and
sometimes transcend foreign and domestic ones) as well as the challenge presented by the global growth of
religious extremism, ethnic violence, state separatism, the decline of patriotism in Russian youth, the
“intensification of global competition,” the “rivalry of value orientations and models of development,” and the
“indirect action” tactics of “leading states” (i.e., NATO members) – their manipulation of popular protests,
extremist organizations, private security companies, and other tools and agents against legitimate
independent governments.

Figure 14 Prime Minister Putin Addressing the Arctic Forum in Moscow, 2010 (Credit: SLD)

In addition to addressing these threats and dangers, the Council press release justified the revisions as needed
to take into account Russian defense legislation that had appeared since 2010, recent changes in the structure
and capabilities of the Russian armed forces, and the need to guide development and acquisition of a new
generation of weapons systems as the existing ones reach the end of their services lives.

The Council insisted on the defensive nature of the doctrine and the government’s intent to apply military
power only as a last resort after Russia first uses non-military tools of influence (diplomacy, energy, and
other).

As foreshadowed by Popov’s remarks, the latest iteration describes NATO as becoming a more serious threat
to Russia due its growing capabilities, both in general and in Russia’s vicinity, its expanding membership, which
is encompassing many former Soviet bloc countries, and NATO’s perceived grasp for “global functions” in
“violation of international law,” a reference to the alliance’s military interventions in Kosovo and Libya without
Moscow’s unreserved approval in the UN Security Council.

Of course, NATO’s stronger policies in Europe result largely from Russian aggression against Ukraine, threats
to other countries, and Moscow’s veto of UN mandates authorizing international interventions to protect
civilians from state-sponsored mass repression.

From the Kremlin’s vantage point, moreover, NATO, the EU, and the rest of the West are allegedly plotting to
overthrow governments friendly to Moscow through “social revolutions” engineered by Western diplomats,
intelligence agencies, information campaigns through the Internet and other communications technologies,
private military contractors and paramilitary groups, local fascists or terrorists, and other instruments.

Second Line of Defense

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