Page 44 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

See the contributions by Roger McDermott (“Putin Signs New Military Doctrine: Core Elements Unchanged”)
and Stephen Blank (“Russia’s Defense Doctrine Reflects Putin’s Paranoia and Siege Mentality”) in Eurasia Daily
Monitor, Volume 12, Issue 2 (January 6, 2015).[/ref]

The Russian command is still studying the issue of how to operationalize an effective “system of non-nuclear
deterrence” and the December 2014 Military Doctrine only hints at what might come, but Russia’s conventional
forces have certainly improved since the 2008 Georgia War and the Doctrine explicitly pledges to continue
the current military reform program.

Yet, the text cites the U.S. development of precisely these systems (without mentioning the United States by
name) as a threat, singling out “strategic conventional precision weapons” (the possible placement of
conventional warheads on ICBMs to develop “prompt global strike” systems that can hit targets throughout the
world in only a few minutes), space-based weapons (possibly anti-satellite weapons but not ballistic missiles,
which Russia guards as the jewels in its arsenal), and ballistic missile defenses.

Even some Russian analysts worry that Russian officials are exaggerating U.S. capabilities in these areas,
while foreign analysts believe this may be to justify Russia’s own programs and military spending. Like the
United States and China, moreover, Russia is also developing hypersonic conventional strike systems, anti-
satellite capabilities, and even missile defenses.

Another novelty is the new emphasis on the Russian military’s role in defending Moscow’s interests in the Arctic
region.

In recent years, the Russian government, citing alleged NATO threats, has decided to establish a network of
military facilities and send more warplanes, warships, and troops to the region. Bolstering Moscow’s hold on
the Crimea is naturally another priority. The doctrine is even willing to discuss with NATO, as long as it is “a
dialogue of equals,” such issues as regional security, arms control, confidence-building measures, and even
joint missile defense.

The Obama administration no doubts welcomes the assertion that Moscow is eager “to maintain equal
relations with interested states and international organizations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.” (art. 50e). Yet, the duty of the Russian military to help “ensure the protection of its citizens,
outside the Russian Federation” (art. 22) is an alarming clause that Moscow could cite to intervene in the Baltic
states, Georgia, Ukraine, and other NATO members and partners.

Although the current version more accurately reflects Russian thinking, it is more difficult to accept the Doctrine
as a definitive guideline for future Russian strategy and tactics. Doctrine tends to lag behind and mirror rather
than lead the development of actual policies, and Russia is undergoing a traumatic economic crisis that could
well derail its planned military buildup.

With the collapse of both world oil prices and the value of the ruble on foreign exchange markets, as well as
the Western sanctions limiting trade and investment with Russia, the Kremlin will find it difficult to sustain its
exceptionally high spending. (Russian government spending for 2015 is scheduled to rise to 35% of the 15.5
trillion ruble budget, or about $100 billion.

The new situation might require the government to roll back its previous goal of modernizing at least 70
percent of its conventional equipment and 85 percent of its strategic nuclear weapons by 2020 in the new
state defense program under development for the years 2016-2025, which should appear in public soon.
Whatever the Doctrine’s intentions, until Russia’s economy recovers, the Kremlin will struggle to achieve the
capabilities designed to implement it.
Second Line of Defense

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