Page 49 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

And with the augmentation of the firepower of their submarine force, the question of the state of our anti-
submarine warfare capabilities is clearly raised by in the North Atlantic and the Northern Pacific waters.

What this means for NORAD as well is that limiting it to air defense limits our ability to deal with the multi-
domain threat.

It is an air and maritime threat and you need to go on that tack and defense through multiple domains, not simply
the classic air battle.
https://breakingdefense.com/2016/04/northcom-defending-north-america-at-ten-and-two-oclock/

The Admiral wisely underscored the point that it was crucial to understand what was in the mind of North
Korea and Russia when contemplating nuclear use.

Question: The nuclear dimension is a key part of all of this, although there is a reluctance to talk about the
Second Nuclear Age and the shaping of deterrent strategies to deal with the new dynamics.
With regard to Russia, they have changed their doctrine and approach.

How do you view their approach and the challenge to us which flows from that change?

Answer: Both the Chinese and Russians have said in their open military literature, that if conflict comes, they want
to escalate conflict in order to de-escalate it.

Now think about that from our side. And so now as crisis escalates, how will Russia or China want to escalate to
deescalate?

The Admiral added:

One has to think through our deterrence strategy as well.

What deters the current leader of North Korea?

What deters non-state actors for getting and using a nuclear weapon?

What will deter Russia from using tactical nuclear weapons in the sequence of how they view dealing with
conventional war?

It is not my view that matters; it is their view; how to I get inside the head of the 21st century actors, and not
simply stay in yesterday’s set of answers?

If one begins to think through what we have seen from the Russians under President Putin we clearly see
significant changes in defense policy, capabilities and approaches.
The Syrian operation saw a deployable air and maritime strike force move to the chess board of global
conflict and achieve key objectives which the political leadership had set for them. Then many of those forces
were withdrawn.

The Russians ended up with an enhanced presence structure through the intervention and political credit in the
region for bolstering the regime in power.

They also used the cruise missiles for the first time that the Admiral referred to as well.

Putin made the nuclear connection himself.

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