Page 81 - North Atlantic and Nordic Defense

North European and North Atlantic Defense: The Challenges Return

The first is the Dane’s acquiring the missiles to go with the sensors aboard their frigates and to position their
frigates to provide area wide defensive capabilities which can be leveraged in the crisis.

The second is the acquisition of the F-35 by key states in the region whose integrated fleet can lay down a
sensor grid with kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities, which can operate rapidly over the Baltic states by simply
extending the airpower integration already envisaged in the defense of the region.

The Norwegians, the Dutch, and possibly the Danes and the Finns will all have F-35s and a completely
integrated force which can rapidly be inserted without waiting for slower paced forces has to be taken
seriously by Russia. There is no time gap within which the Russians can wedge their forces, for Norway and
Denmark are not likely to stand by and watch the Russians do what they want in the Baltics. With the
integrated F-35 fleet, they would need to wait on slower paced NATO deliberations to deploy significant
force useable immediately in Baltic defenses.

The third is the coming UK carrier, which can provide a local core intervention capability to plug into the F-35
forces in the region and to add amphibious assault capability.

The fourth is that the USN-USMC team coming with F-35B and Osprey enabled assault forces can plug in
rapidly as well.

The fifth is the evolving integration of air and naval systems. The long reach of Aegis enabled by F-35/Aegis
integration can add a significant offensive/defensive capability to any reinforcement force, and the
Norwegians are a local force that will have such a capability.
By leveraging current capabilities and reshaping the template for Baltic defense, the coming modernization
efforts will only enhance the viability of the template and significantly enhance credible deterrence, rather
than doing what RT referred to scornfully as “US troops drills in Baltic states is more a political than military
show.”
A key advantage of the approach is that it is led by the Nordics and gets away from the Russian game of
making this always about the US and the “US-led” Alliance.

Figure 27 Spanish Typhoon on the platform in winter conditions during their Baltic Air Policing mission. Photo
courtesy of: Spanish Air Force.

Putin and his ilk can play this game, but European led capabilities are crucial to reshaping Russian
expectations about how non-Americans view their aggression as well.

And what might be the implications of not having an effective defense of the Baltic states on the US and
NATO?

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