Page 25 - Williams Foundation Future of Electronic Warfare Seminar

A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia

"We are doing pretty well at buying platforms, which allow us to observe in the EW area, and we are buying
platforms, which can act within that space.

“But we can not orient ourselves effectively enough and make the kind of decisions in a timely manner which
we will need to be able to do.

"So applying the OODA loop, we are doing reasonably in the Observe and Act area but not enough in the
Orientate and Decide part of the OODA loop.
“How do I manage to leverage my intelligence data base and networking forward to locate and identify the
proper threat so I can orient my EW capabilities and then how do I make decisions to deny, degrade, deceive
or destroy that threat?”

In that discussion, he underscored a core point about the contribution of the Williams Foundation Conferences .

“I probably would not have had the thought I just expressed to you if I was not going to make this
presentation.

"It takes you out of your day job and forces you to think at a different level, which is critical if we are going
to shape the kind of force which we need to develop and deploy.”

At the conference, Air Commodore Chipman entitled his presentation “Electronic Warfare – C4I Enablers,”
which allowed him to discuss what he called the backend of the EW Warfighting capability.

In effect, what he outlined throughout his remarks were the building blocks crucial to enhance the ability to
deny EW success to the adversary as you tried to maximize your own ability to prevail in the electro
magnetic spectrum.

Again, it was not about a single point of entry specialized EW platform; it was about the force being able to
shape an approach and to evolve an approach that minimizes vulnerabilities and maximizes capabilities to
exploit EW vulnerabilities of an adversary.

He started by discussing a radar range equation, which exemplifies the importance of force design, and
shaping an approach.
My understanding of electronic warfare started to improve when I was taught this equation – what a great place
to start. In a very basic sense, this equation tells us that the range at which radar first detects a target increases
with the amount of power transmitted, the antenna’s performance, the radar’s operating wavelength and the
targets radar cross section. Detection range also decreases with the minimum power required to discriminate a
target return from competing clutter and noise.

This equation can help explain why long-range surveillance radars operate at lower frequencies, why integrating
force elements can deliver superior detection performance. It explains how basic noise jamming decreases sensor
performance. It explains why the United States has invested so heavily in stealth technology over the last 30
years, and why China and Russia are now doing the same.

From this perspective, he then discussed low observability as a key force design issue in the current period.

It’s important to understand that stealth does not make an aircraft invisible; it just makes it extremely difficult to
detect, track and engage. It is also important to understand that stealth does not just apply to the aircraft’s radar
signature. Modern stealth aircraft utilise low observable technology across the entire electromagnetic spectrum to
reduce radio frequency, infrared, electro-optical, visual and acoustic signature.

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