Page 26 - Williams Foundation Future of Electronic Warfare Seminar

A New Approach and Attitude to Electronic Warfare in Australia

I make this point to address a common fallacy; that somehow low-observable technology is being made redundant
by the proliferation of counter-stealth technologies in our region. There is no doubt low observable technology will
be subject to the same counter and counter-counter cycle as other forms of electronic warfare, but there is also no
doubt that low observable technology combined with specialist operational tactics makes stealth aircraft far easier
to hide in the electromagnetic spectrum using on-board or off-board jammers than conventional aircraft. They are
more survivable and better equipped to penetrate contested airspace in order to achieve an operational objective.
Stealth is not just viable, it’s becoming increasingly vital.

For Air Commodore Chipman, the force design issue, which is crucial here is signature management.

Clearly, the F-35 is part of the low signature focus which the RAAF is pursuing, but there is a broader issue – how
do you reduce your overall radar signature profile and enhance the adversaries vulnerabilities in the same
domain?

Signature management is certainly not unique to the air domain. Our Army is now consciously minimising their
electronic signature during Brigade manoeuvre exercises. And our submariners have long been masters in masking
their signature, and making very deliberate vulnerability assessments before exposing themselves to the risk of
detection. As the battle for supremacy of the electromagnetic spectrum intensifies, we will all need to rise to their
level of skill and expertise.

This includes signature management at the force level. The networks used to achieve force integration must be
secure, resilient and persistent – but they should also be designed and operated cognisant of their electromagnetic
signature. We will need to make compromises that balance the operational advantages of joint force integration
through networking, and the imperative to minimise our vulnerability through effective signature management.
And we’ll continue to employ force level electronic attack in its historical supporting role, to mask a force that is
no longer able to hide below an adversary’s detection threshold.

He then went on to describe way ahead in terms of Boyd’s OODA loop as he suggested he would in the
remarks in our discussion prior to the conference.

Boyd himself identified the orient phase as quote “the most important part of the OODA loop since it shapes the
way we observe, the way we decide, the way we act”. I’m at risk of over-simplifying this stage by suggesting the
task is to take observed data and generate meaning. This involves accurately identifying and locating specific
emitters in the electromagnetic spectrum. In this way, we create a tactical operating picture, which provides
essential situational awareness across the joint force.

Identification is heuristic – we observe specific characteristics of a signal in the environment and compare those
characteristics with a database of previously observed signals in order to establish the identity of that emitter. We
improve the accuracy of identification by correlating different characteristics the threat system’s emissions
collected by different sensors.

Locating emitters in the environment is largely achieved through triangulation. This is one of the great advantages
of networking: if a single signal is received by two geographically separated receivers, the task of accurately
locating the source of that signal becomes relatively simple. However, both receivers must interpret the signal the
same way and cooperate constructively to identify and locate it, otherwise they create ambiguity and confusion.

This is why intelligence mission data is so important. It is the heuristic frame of reference we use to orientate
ourselves in the electromagnetic spectrum. Developing joint force concepts for emitter identification and
geolocation will require all contributing systems operate to a compatible frame of reference.

Second Line of Defense

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