Page 6 - Maritime Services and the Kill Web

The Maritime Services, the Allies and Shaping the Kill Web

Our visits to FALLON, MAWTS-1, to the UK and to Australia provided several data points on how the U.S. and
core allies are working on building out a kill web air enabled force.

We then look at the significant opportunities, which new training and development integration can provide to
shape a more integrated force able to execute a kill web going forward.

Finally, we then address two case studies of the way ahead: working the unmanned-manned transition and the
electronic warfare or the non-kinetic payload domain.
And we conclude with some thoughts from the newly appointed Air Commander Australia on the challenge of
st
shaping an effective 21 century combat force.

SHAPING A KILL WEB: CONCEPTUAL ISSUES

Force Design for High Intensity Operations: Payload-Utility Capabilities
and the Kill Web
August 27, 2017

By Edward Timperlake

This article argues that yayload utility can be a driver for understanding the future development of combat
systems.
To understand Pu with full honor to John Boyd, it can be noted that Observe/Orient (OO) is essentially target
acquisition, and Decide/Act (DA) is target engagement.

Thus there is a very simple formula, better and better TA and TE =more effective employment of all payloads
available to the battle commander.

It is the process of understanding the huge complexities in such a simple formula that is the challenge.
In this article, I introduce these concepts as a way to understand how to shape and execute the kill web, or the
distributed combat learning and engagement force.

Introduction
Prevailing in high-intensity combat is the seen in the differences between combatants.

The quality of uniformed military personnel is critical, and the ability to mobilize rapidly and effectively is
crucial.

The tactical skills of combat leaders at all ranks are essential, and the correct focus on constant appropriate
training makes it all come together.

U.S. military doctrine must always be dynamic enough to empower all the crucial intangible components when
war breaks out.

In some nations, a sophisticated new weapon system can substantially augment the capabilities of its
operators.
In other nations, that same weapon system can overwhelm its operators and prove virtually worthless.

Second Line of Defense

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