Page 21 - An Illusion of Complicity: Terrorism and the Illegal Ivory Trade in East Africa

8 An Illusion of Complicity

Instead, a survey by the authors of online English-language media stories published between 2011
and August 2015 by Western and African outlets highlights 115 articles citing the involvement of
Al-Shabaab and other groups in the ivory trade. Only eight provide any critical commentary on
the claim, demonstrating the extent of the narrative’s acceptance. The remainder repeat – and
to greater or lesser degrees embellish – the claims. Many articles promote additional variant
claims of undisclosed origin.17

Some of the narrative’s earliest manifestations in the media allude to Al-Shabaab’s direct
involvement in poaching. Amongst the first are investigative pieces from 2011 by the Independent
newspaper and Vanity Fair magazine. The Vanity Fair piece, by Alex Shoumatoff, argues that
Al-Shabaab was earning significantly by engaging in poaching in Kenya. Maryrose Fison in the
Independent similarly declares poaching to be ‘a major source of funding for terrorist ... groups’
like Al-Shabaab.18

More influential was a 2012 investigative story by Pulitzer Prize-winner Jeffrey Gettleman in the
New York Times. This article notes that Al-Shabaab, the LRA and Janjaweed were ‘hunting down
elephants and using the tusks to buy weapons and sustain their mayhem’.19 On Al-Shabaab,
Gettleman cites claims by several Somali residents that the group was both training poachers and
encouraging Kenyan villagers to source tusks for onward sale.20 This argument was reinforced
the same year when the then-director of the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), Julius Kipng’etich,
affirmed that Al-Shabaab was sending poaching gangs into Kenya.21

Alongside the EAL report, these brief references have formed the evidence-base for most
subsequent reporting. This has led to often confused accounts that fail to distinguish between
participation in poaching and involvement in trafficking. Such reporting nonetheless took off
after Al-Shabaab’s deadly attack on Nairobi’s Westgate Mall in September 2013. In its wake,
local and international media seized on the ivory–terrorism narrative, explaining the group’s
capacity with reference to East Africa’s poaching crisis.

of Necessity?’, CSIS, February 2014; Christopher Anzalone, ‘The Rise and Decline of Al-Shabaab’,
Turkish Review (Vol. 4, No. 4, 2014); Ken Menkhaus, ‘Conflict Assessment 2014: Northern Kenya
and Somaliland’, Danish Demining Group, March 2015.
17. For example, five stories imply that Al-Qa’ida is profiting from Al-Shabaab’s affiliation to the
group; twenty-three claim that Al-Shabaab is gaining 40 per cent of its total funding from ivory,
as opposed to 40 per cent of fighters’ salaries as the original Elephant Action League (EAL) report
posits; twelve articles cite different monthly ivory revenues from those described in the EAL
report; and ten argue ivory helped to finance the Westgate Mall attack specifically. None of these
variants is based on clearly identified sources.
18. Alex Shoumatoff, ‘Agony and Ivory’, Vanity Fair, August 2011; Maryrose Fison, ‘The £6bn Trade in
Animal Smuggling’, Independent, 6 March 2011.
19. Jeffrey Gettleman, ‘Elephants Dying in Epic Frenzy as Ivory Fuels Wars and Profits’, New York
Times, 3 September 2012.
20. Ibid.
21. Horand Knaup and Jan Puhl, ‘“Blood Ivory”: Brutal Elephant Slaughter Funds African Conflicts’, Der
Spiegel, 13 September 2012.