Page 67 - bne monthly magazine October 2022

bne October 2022 Eurasia I 67
Azerbaijan knows that power is power Ani Mejlumyan in Yerevan
This week’s attack by Azerbaijan on Armenia is a crude reminder that Baku is getting increasingly impatient about the failure to reach a full peace deal since its victory in the 2020 war over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh, and that Baku wants to use the new balance of power in the region to dictate the terms of such a deal.
This has raised fears that the region could once again descend into bloody conflict. Armenia has so far reported 150 military and eight civilian deaths and more than 2,500 civilians displaced. Azerbaijan reported 50 military deaths by September 14, making it one of the worst escalations in the fighting since the 1990s. In the 2020 war, 6,500 were killed and Azerbaijan reconquered
large areas of land in and around Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan has regularly accused Armenia of dragging its feet in implementing the 2020 ceasefire agreement, including moving towards a peace agreement for the territory, which is surrounded by Azerbaijan and internationally recognised as part of that country but is inhabited mainly by ethnic Armenians.
Azerbaijan has also refused to negotiate with Armenia through the Minsk Group of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, which led negotiations between the two sides since the first war in the 1990s, in which Azerbaijan lost all of Nagorno-Karabakh and several other regions on its borders with Armenia. On multiple occasions, Aliyev has written off the efforts of the group, which includes Russia, France and the US, as useless, because he sees it as fatally divided and unable to promote his goals.
Instead Baku has accepted negotiations mediated by Moscow or the EU. This has been backed up by intermittent
military pressure to concentrate minds in Yerevan, using the imbalance in troops and materiel created by Baku’s big rearmament programme, financed by its energy wealth.
Russia is the guarantor of the ceasefire agreement that ended the 2020 war between the two sides and has some 2,000 peacekeepers stationed in Nagorno- Karabakh. Russia also has a military base in Gyumri, on the Armenian-Turkish border, with several thousand soldiers. Armenia has a military treaty of security guarantee with Russia separately and is part of the military block CSTO.
But now, since Russia's invasion of Ukraine has diverted its attention and led many to doubt its military capabilities, Azerbaijan appears to be testing Moscow’s willingness to keep the peace in the South Caucasus.
In addition, the war may have
made Baku feel that it has become indispensible to the EU after Brussels signed a deal with Azerbaijan in July to double the gas imports it buys in order to cut its dependence on Russian supplies. European Commission
President Ursula von der Leyen visited Baku last month in a trip notable for the lack of criticism of Aliyev’s repressive regime.
Azerbaijan is now pushing for a peace deal that is more like an ultimatum to Armenia. While the wording on paper is vague, the rhetoric in Baku
is loud and clear; it wants a sovereign corridor through Armenia’s Syunik region connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan enclave, which is mainly inhabited by ethnic Azerbaijainis, and the recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan.
Accepting both demands would not only be political suicide for Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan but would also impose long-term security risks, including the possibility of ethnic cleansing of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh.
Nevertheless, Pashinyan announced
on September 14 in parliament that he is willing to sign a deal, hinting that
he would make concessions that could threaten his survival. The news sparked demonstrations across Armenia.
Armenian volunteers training. This week's fighting has raised fears that the region could once again descend into bloody conflict. / bne IntelliNews
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