Page 71 - bne monthly magazine October 2022

bne October 2022
Russian peacekeepers with less than 500 military transport vehicles in Karabakh.
The military tensions have been obstructing the diplomatic dialogue on restoring the bilateral transportation and economic ties. The progress on the delimitation and demar- cation of the borders is also compromised, despite the fact that the EU has joined these efforts in a parallel mediation process.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan understand that Russian mediating power can face objective constraints, primarily because of the consequences of the lasting aggression against Ukraine. In Armenian eyes, the Russian security guarantees should ensure protection against external threats. Despite Russia’s current weaknesses, Armenia cannot simply escape the Russian dependence in the security field. A qualitative change in the strategic preferences of Armenia can only
arise if Russia were to be replaced with a solid alternative to counterbalance the Azeri-Turkish tandem. An international UN mission deployed in Armenia, directly or with the assis- tance of Georgia, could ease the pressure, but will still need the Russians to supervise the situation in Karabakh and the Lachin Corridor.
From the Azeri standpoint, the presence of Russia is useful to the extent that it helps to shape and shift the position of the Armenian side, avoiding military confrontations that could lead to international isolation and sanctions. Frequent bilateral talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin allows Aliyev to project power at home and is also used as part of multi-vector diplomacy with the West. These aspects do not reduce Azerbaijan’s determination to complete its campaign of restoration of its territorial integrity.
If Baku is the initiator of the shelling against Armenia, this could only serve as a way to sow division between Yerevan and Moscow and undermine Russia’s relevance as a security player in the region. Such thoughts have not yet been revealed by Azerbaijan and are quite problematic, since that would imply a fight with Russia with all the related consequences.
Armenia’s options and Azerbaijan’s motivations
The immediate reaction of Armenia was to ask the help of Russia, with which it is linked by a 1997 defence treaty that ideally should have activated military assistance from the Russian side. The next provider of security is the CSTO’s Art. 4, which, as in the case of Art. 5 of Nato, triggers the collective defence obligations. On 14 September, Armenia triggered the article on collective defence. According to the treaty, even without an official condemnation of the Azeri actions, the member states are obliged to express solidarity and supply defence assistance. This does not include, however, a manda- tory deployment of a peacekeeping mission, mirroring the experience of Kazakhstan at the beginning of 2022 during the mass protests, allegedly hijacked by the plotters of a coup.
Opinion 71 The UN should be informed about any measures taken after
the triggering of the collective defence clause.
In the meantime, the CSTO Extraordinary Council decided
to send an evaluation mission, following Article 2 of the treaty activated by Armenia on the day of the escalations on September 13. The mission will travel to Armenia to collect information on the circumstances of the hostilities and write a report. The "evaluation" mission will include the organisa- tion's leadership and member state representatives (five without Armenia), making it seem more like a "bureaucratic" intervention than anything else. Armenia seeks to prove
its allegations about the attacks against its territories. That would solidify international efforts to blame Azerbaijan for the ongoing hostilities. A small first success has already been achieved, as French President Emmanuel Macron's request to his Azeri counterpart on the urgency of stopping hostilities and respecting the ceasefire agreement showed.
This made France the only international actor that has so far sent a signal referring to Azerbaijan by talking about hostili- ties. This differentiates France from Russia, the CSTO or the EU that put the two sides on an equal footing while demand- ing an end to the escalation.
“If Baku is the initiator of the shelling against Armenia, this could only serve as a way to sow division between Yerevan and Moscow and undermine Russia’s relevance as
a security player in the region”
Azerbaijan will have to think twice before shelling while the CSTO evaluation mission is investigating the villages hit by Azeri artillery. This is also a risky moment of legitimacy for the CSTO, if Baku disregards the presence of the mission and continues the shelling. Azerbaijan would more likely abstain than actually draw any attention and confirm that it is the initiator or the main responsible side. The decisions of Baku might also change if the CSTO countries are getting involved in the supply of defence aid to Armenia. Until then, Azerbai- jan is claiming that its shelling is a response to the alleged “provocations” of the Armenians placing military equipment next to civilian objectives when targeting Azerbaijan.
This way Baku tries to justify the extension of its military operation deep into Armenian territory. The same argu- ment of using the civilians was the cause of huge scandals around the heavily criticised Amnesty International’s report on Ukraine. The accusations launched should be proved and probably Russia and CSTO are expecting the CSTO mission to verify their plausibility.
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