Page 67 - RusRPTAug24
P. 67
bne August 2024
Opinion 67
increase its leverage. This might have worked until February 24, 2022. Pashinyan's government is now convinced that Russia threatens Armenia's independence and sovereignty. Moreover, Pashinyan has accused two CSTO member states, Belarus and Russia, of supporting Azerbaijan in preparing for war against Armenia.
Today, Pashinyan's government is heading towards freezing relations with Moscow. Pashinyan understands that leaving the CSTO would also mean leaving the EEU. Yerevan has suspended its participation in the CSTO, and it is only a de jure a member of this alliance. Armenian officials frequently express accusatory and critical remarks towards Moscow, freezing political contacts with Russian officials.
Receiving only threats and dangers to its independence instead of support from Russia, Armenia has made deepening cooperation with the EU and the US its main tool for protecting its statehood. Armenia is deepening its cooperation with the West at Russia's expense.
“Pashinyan's government will likely take practical steps to apply for EU membership in 2026 during the parliamentary elections”
Yet the step of joining the EU will be a major earthquake in Armenian-Russian relations, and Yerevan must approach that day in good economic and security shape. Sharp anti-Russian steps can endanger the gradual distancing from Moscow.
Yerevan has chosen a subtle, smooth, and peaceful approach to disengagement, avoiding the noisy and dangerous experience of Georgia's former president Mikheil Saakashvili. Recently, Armenia and the USA have elevated their relations to the level of a strategic partnership commission. While postponing the exercise with Georgia, the USA is conducting an exercise with Armenia. The USA is involved in the reform of the Armenian Armed Forces.
Under the leadership of President Emmanuel Macron, France broke the taboo and is selling weapons to Armenia, which still holds CSTO membership. With France's support, the European Union very quickly deployed observers on the Armenia-Azerbaijan border. On April 5, crucial economic projects were agreed upon. All this might have seemed like fantasy a year ago, but today it is a reality.
However, Armenia may lose an important partner in its European integration efforts if Donald Trump is elected US president in November. Joe Biden's administration has elevated US-Armenia relations to a strategic level, which might be cancelled by Trump.
Armenia could also lose a powerful ally in France. If the right-wing populist forces continue their triumph in France and Macron loses his political support in parliament, French support might weaken. The likelihood of forming a right- wing populist government in France could not only end Paris's activity towards Armenia but also weaken the EU as a geopolitical actor. This could endanger the EU's enlargement policy and even cast doubt on Ukraine's membership.
Strengthening Macron's position in France and Biden's reelection would accelerate Armenia's European integration process and give more confidence to Pashinyan.
Today, it is not possible to unequivocally assert that Armenia will not apply for EU membership. This depends primarily on the policies adopted by the member states of the European Union and the newly elected leadership of the EU regarding enlargement. If the parties opposing EU enlargement continue to win at the national level, Yerevan's European course might be halted or complicated.
For a long time, Viktor Orbán's government in Hungary impeded the process of providing 10 million euros in support from the European Peace Facility to Armenia. But eventually, Hungary gave its consent. Armenia is currently negotiating with individual EU countries on visa liberalization. It
is understood that Austria, with a centre-right political government, has also posed certain difficulties in negotiations with Armenia. In the next elections, the far-right Freedom Party may win in Austria. This could also jeopardize the EU's enlargement policy.
Unexpectedly positive news comes from Iran. The election of the reformist candidate Masoud Pezeshkian as president will be favourable for Armenia's European integration agenda. Pezeshkian is a supporter of improving relations with the West and could approach Armenia's aspiration to join the EU with understanding. For Iran, the establishment of a Western military base in Armenia is a red line, while EU membership is seen as a chance for economic cooperation with the West.
It will also be important that the Georgian Dream party of Bidzina Ivanishvili, whose pro-Russian stance threatens the country's EU membership, does not win in Georgia in October. By controlling Georgia, Russia could also close Armenia's path to Europe.
The referendum on EU membership is purely a technical process and not the most crucial. Armenia must become European in terms of economy, energy, security, democracy, human rights, and political system. Armenia needs to carry out internal procedures of European integration as efficiently as possible.
Theoretically, Armenia can adopt European standards without joining the EU if geopolitical conditions are unfavourable. However, if they improve Armenia will apply for candidate status for EU membership.
www.bne.eu