Page 71 - BNE_magazine_06_2020 Growers

bne June 2020
Opinion 71
There are many reasons for this but it is partially fuelled by the sense that Zelenskiy, in staking his presidency on making peace, has gone too far in accommodating Moscow. This perception has been whipped up by events like last years’ prisoner exchanges with Russia and Russia-backed separatists in the east. The returned Ukrainians were welcomed home, but Kyiv’s decision to hand over a suspect in the downing of flight MH17 as well as riot police accused of killing civilians during 2014's uprising caused wide upset.
Perhaps most controversial has been the Steinmeier formula. The idea of local elections and special status for occupied areas has proven especially divisive, with small groups of protesters taking to the streets of the capital after its signing in October. This opposition movement has only grown since. Zelenskiy has drawn red lines to reassure his critics – an eclectic mix of veterans, civil society, old-guard politicians
etc – that neither will happen until armed groups have left the region and Kyiv controls the border with Russia. He has also framed any special status for the east as part of a broader programme of country-wide decentralisation. But there remains confusion over the detail as this timeline contradicts Minsk – something Moscow shows no sign of deviating from -, which only gives powers back to Kyiv after elections. This is, understandably, unacceptable. As Freedom House reported recently,” the rule of law and civil liberties in general are
not respected” in the occupied Donbas. Voting under these conditions would be a sham.
There may yet be a political work-around or diplomatic fudge that would keep Zelenskiy from diluting his red lines too much, but even then many sceptics will regard any plan as
a backdoor for Moscow to legitimise its interference. This is emblematic of a broader intellectual debate within Ukraine over whether reintegration can be done without undermining the country’s security and statehood. Reintegration would
no doubt bring about challenges. Never mind the reliance
on good faith from Moscow that its meddling would come
to an end; bringing the Donbas back into the fold would be complicated, costly, and could even upset the stability needed to allow domestic reform should old political wounds be reopened. A much baulked at (yet frankly warranted) dialogue on national identity would be unavoidable.
But the alternative – deliberately hardening the border within Ukraine at the expense of reintegration – risks alienating those remaining in the Donbas while allowing quality of life to further deteriorate and Russia to tighten its grip. It is hard to get reliable information from the occupied areas but we know enough to say living conditions for civilians are miserable. Toxic narratives of complicity and resentment towards these residents are already on the rise within small pockets of social media elsewhere in the country. The longer this isolation continues, the harder future reconciliation becomes as social and economic bonds erode and a generation or more grow up in a (literally) divided Ukraine. And while some commentators see hardening the border as a chance for Kyiv to focus on
its westward trajectory, recent government reshuffling and dismissals suggests that despite the strides taken since 2014, cutting the Donbas loose would not necessarily guarantee a competent, reform focused administration. It is a dilemma – on what terms to reintegrate, if at all – that Ukrainian society will continue to wrestle with and one, which the current government will have to help facilitate. But it must be done with transparency and humility, taking into account genuine public concerns while engaging with, but not catering to, those more hardline minority voices. Kyiv shouldn’t waste the opportunity.
Of course, there is no peace without Moscow's consent, whatever Kyiv’s intentions. While the Kremlin's control over the quasi-republics in the east is not absolute, it can end the war should it want to. Moscow would have much to gain from doing so. It never wanted responsibility for the region but is now shackled to it along with the significant economic, social and environmental damage the war has wreaked. The project has been a disruptive burden, harming Russia's relations
with the west and alienating much of Ukraine's pro-Russian
“It has been an experimental toolbox of ideas. Some have worked better than others. Some have been rushed and haphazard. But they have all been well intentioned”
political class; gone is the chance of any subtler influence over the country’s domestic politics. And while not as expensive as maintaining the annexation of Crimea, the self-proclaimed republics are financially dependent on Moscow, swallowing up resources that could be better spent at home. It has been
a strategic failure.
Despite all this Moscow has kept the necessary compromises at arm's length, preferring to let the fighting simmer just enough to avoid it becoming frozen. This is partly about what it views as credibility; it doesn't want to be seen retreating from a conflict it denies involvement in. This will continue to frustrate finding a genuine settlement. But Moscow's stubbornness is also borne out of a belief that war in Ukraine is an extension
of war with the West. This has bred a desire to have any resolution to the conflict allow it to maintain a degree of control over Kyiv's political future – something incompatible with upholding Ukrainian sovereignty.
COVID could change everything (or nothing)
Where does this leave us? Any efforts to de-escalate the conflict should be welcomed. Summits, meetings, and exchanges – even the more controversial ones so long as
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