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        72 Opinion
bne June 2020
     they’re done with care and planning – can help build a useful diplomatic framework to ease the more difficult trade-offs. But all this remains of limited value so long as Moscow fails
to tame its inflexibility. The dismissal of Vladislav Surkov and appointment of the more practical Dmitry Kozak as Ukraine negotiator in February was seen by some Kremlin-watchers as hinting toward a potential thaw. But it is just as likely that this technocratic, once architect of the Moldova ‘federalisation’ strategy, and long term ally of President Vladimir Putin will play a managerial role in maintaining the status quo. Nobody really knows.
The elephant in the room here is COVID-19. We are still mapping out the geopolitical repercussions of a global pandemic that cares little for the convictions of countries
and their leaders, let alone armed conflicts. It is too early to know the breadth of impact on Russia and Ukraine, but the public health and economic challenges could be long lasting and ultimately bleed into the political at a time of increased volatility. The virus has tested governments’ ability to juggle several crises at once, pushing even the most organised to prioritise and make difficult choices. It couldn’t come at a worse time for Kyiv as it deals with a rushed cabinet reshuffle, controversial IMF bailout, and concern over reform and corruption.
The pandemic will continue to impact the peace process, perhaps even shape the future of the conflict itself. It has moved meetings online and closed vital crossing points in the east, while protests against the advisory board were restricted because of Ukraine’s quarantine. Some level of disruption will persist for a while. Channels of diplomatic communication and negotiation will be slow to resume. Kyiv will need to be prepared for those countries needed to help put pressure
on Moscow – the United States, France, Germany – to be preoccupied with tackling the consequences of COVID-19 at home.
The virus has also fast-forwarded the decline of conditions in the occupied Donbas for a vulnerable population, which
relies on an already inadequate health system and fragile economy. For Ukraine, this instability will put questions
about the feasibility of reintegration (particularly economic) into sharper focus as Kyiv weighs up how best to cope with the crisis. As for Russia, despite increasingly isolated from shocks its economy remains vulnerable – an imbalanced health system and promise of national project investment may make Moscow wonder whether continuing to subsidise the occupied east is the best use of its money. All the while, social distancing and strict hygiene amongst soldiers will be hard if not impossible to enforce on both sides of the frontline.
Before COVID-19 it was clear the quasi-republics were becoming unsustainable in the long term. Financially precarious, politically mismanaged, and in demographic decline – the pandemic will only reinforce these trends.
If there were to be the faintest of silver linings from the outbreak it might be a new sense of urgency to push for compromise. While a lasting solution will always entail
more than the military sphere, an effective, durable ceasefire would be a start. A further agreement to ‘update’ Minsk would be better. It is also tempting to hope the crisis may offer up opportunities; whether it be for Kyiv to build trust through humanitarian aid to those in the occupied east, or persuade Moscow to take a long, slow off-ramp out of the conflict all together.
Much of this is wishful thinking of course. There may be no change to the Kremlin’s calculations. Zelenskiy may continue to struggle with competing interests at home. A distracted Europe and US may neglect deploying more creative carrots and sticks. Fighting in the Donbas may even intensify over the summer. What we can be more sure about is that the virus has added another layer of uncertainty to a conflict with no military solution. Unfortunately – at least for now – a political one remains distant.
Lindsay Mackenzie is a writer and editor based in Glasgow, Scotland.
  Post-COVID recessions bring risk
of turbulent spring
Clare Nuttall in Glasgow
The Great Recession 10 years ago, accompanied by severe youth unemployment and falling living standards, was the trigger for the Arab Spring, where demonstrations toppled long-established authoritarian governments in the Middle East and North Africa. This time around we are entering an even deeper recession and the governments that failed to rise to the crisis – through denial, dismissing the dangers or simply
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incompetence, resulting in unnecessary deaths and economic hardship – should fear their day of reckoning.
So far, the coronavirus (COVID-19) has spread regardless of government type. It made the cross from mammal to human in authoritarian China, spread massively in long-established West European democracies and is now gaining momentum in populist












































































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