Page 69 - bne_September 2022_20220802

bne September 2022
Opinion 69
the short term, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has an advantage in relations with Russia, which is struggling to adjust to limited access to foreign markets. The Turkish position became a challenge in the western field, playing
a determining role in the enlargement of Nato and the "Istanbul grain deal” on July 22 that makes possible Ukraine's grain shipments by sea.
Turkey – a useful partner for Ukraine and its allies
Turkey's prompt assistance to Ukraine was instrumental in the early victories of the Ukrainian side against the Russian invasion. From a military point of view, the delivery of the Turkish Bayraktar UAV to Ukraine helped to slow down the Russian advance, generating incalculable losses in both weapons and human resources. In August, Ukraine signed an agreement with Turkey to allow local production of hard- ware and software components for Bayraktar.
In the political sphere, Recep Erdogan has offered Turkey as a mediator between Moscow and Kyiv for a military ceasefire agreement. Negotiation attempts were unsuccessful due
to Ukraine's justified mistrust of Russia, which seeks to dismantle its smaller neighbour. Negotiations have reached an impasse after Ukrainian forces revealed egregious violations by Russian soldiers against civilians in Bucha and other parts of Ukraine that closely resemble war crimes.
Ukraine's success on the battlefield and access to Western military weapons made Turkish diplomatic efforts to reach a ceasefire truce irrelevant. In any case, Turkey managed to negotiate a global grain agreement between Ukraine and Russia on a UN platform. It made possible a safe export
of grain from Ukraine to foreign markets. The maritime unblocking of the shipment of wheat, corn, sunflower seeds, etc. traditionally exported by Ukrainian producers has a positive impact on the humanitarian situation in the Global South.
Assisting Ukrainian ships to depart with commercial food from three (Odesa, Chernomorsk and Yuzhny) of the six ports on the Black Sea coast that remained under Kyiv's control increased Turkey's geopolitical weight, at least during the Russian war against Ukraine. The monitoring of the implementation of Ukrainian grain shipments, carried out by the Istanbul-based Joint Coordination Centre, will maintain Turkey's strategic relevance. The EU and Ukraine understand that Turkish contributions to the restoration of any semblance of past normality are crucial.
“Autocratic solidarity”
Parallel to supporting Ukraine, Turkey has also been showing a circumstantial alliance with Russia. Turkey's no-sanctions policy provoked immediate sympathy in Moscow. Despite not aligning itself with Western sanctions, Ankara did not gain any bold negative fame as did, say, Serbia. Nato and the EU refute the neutral position on sanctioning Russia expressed by a member state and an aspiring country to join the EU,
respectively. By opting out from sanctions, the Turks did not face any massive public or political pressure from either from Western or Ukrainian politicians and the public.
Unafraid of consequences due to unique levers in Russia's confrontation with Ukraine, Erdogan sided with Putin at least one time. He shamed German Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock for disrespecting the Russian president. However, no massive backlash came from the West against Erdogan's situation comparable to the blame received by Emmanuel Macron, who expressed concern about "humiliating" Putin. Perhaps, Erdogan is showing a critical attitude against those who condemn Putin not only because of a kind of personal intolerance. This also seems like a sign of “autocratic solidarity” as the West joins forces to protect the international liberal order.
Circumstantial alliance with commercial interest
In addition to the political closeness, what stands out are
the burgeoning economic ties between the two countries. While Russia needs technologically advanced markets that can substitute restricted exports from the West, Turkey is in a strategic position to seize the economic opportunities. In fact, it can choose how extensive it wants economic ties with Russia to develop, avoiding risky interdependencies. The reality is of
“While Russia needs technologically advanced markets that can substitute restricted exports from the West,
Turkey is in a strategic position to seize the economic opportunities”
such nature that Turkish exports are badly needed to mitigate scarce Russian imports and buy some time to develop localised production and import substitution capabilities. By investing in greater Turkish geopolitical prominence, Moscow is increasing its southern neighbour's immunity from secondary Western sanctions. Consequently, Turkey is taking higher risks by using more individualistic approaches towards Russia, without consulting them with the West.
The Sochi meeting between Erdogan and Putin in early August showed the readiness for some fundamental changes.
First, Turkey agreed to pay for Russian gas partly in rubles. This favours a higher demand for rubles and accelerates de-dollarization, which would reduce Russia's vulnerabilities under the sanction’s regime.
Second, the two allies want to increase bilateral trade to $100bn, putting Turkish trade turnover on a par with that of
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