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China, Russia’s biggest single trade partner. It could lead to
a boom in Turkish goods and services on the Russian market and an increase in energy resources sold by Russia at a political discount. Still, oil is what can be shipped in larger volumes because the capacities of the existing pipelines, "Turkish Stream" and "Blue Stream", are limited to 31.5bn and 16bn cubic meters respectively. No intention to develop new pipelines on the bottom of the Black Sea has been announced so far.
Third, their central banks are in close coordination, suggest- ing that Russia could try to convince Ankara to set up an inte- grated payment system to replace the need for SWIFT, from which most Russian banks were cut off due to sanctions. The integration of national payment systems remains a difficult goal to achieve and even Russia's main partners decided to stay out – China and India.
Russia, for its part, rejoices in minor successes in the banking field. Five Turkish banks are making regulatory adjustments preparing the ground for the use of the Russian international bank payment card "MIR". Such a measure will simplify Russian tourism affected by the withdrawal of Visa and MasterCard. It may also facilitate the relocation of Russian elites from Europe to Turkey, which has become one of the most attractive destinations available to Russian citizens "fleeing" Europe due to the application of sanctions.
The closeness between the two countries, the Turkish technological potential and the perceived immunity on
BALKAN BLOG
Southeast Europe’s ties to Russia prove hard to sever
Clare Nuttall in Glasgow
When Russia invaded Ukraine in February, both EU members and most candidate countries were quick to condemn the invasion and sign up to sanc-
tions packages. Even in previously sympathetic countries like Bulgaria, an overwhelming tide of political and public opinion turned against Moscow. However, as war drags on, it’s clear that the ties that have long bound certain Southeast European counties to Russia – such as shared culture and religion, or energy dependence – are proving harder to loosen than it initially appeared.
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secondary sanctions, converts Turkey into a valuable partner in the Russian strategic energy project too. Thus, in August, it was announced that Turkish Karpowership would be joining the second LNG project in the Arctic to provide Russia with floating power plants to support the construction operations. The Turkish side did not officially confirm this step, but the company has experience of working in countries that are under sanctions regime (Cuba, Sudan or Guinea-Bissau),
way less restrictive than those applied on Russia.
As long as Russia's war against Ukraine continues, Turkey wants to play a central role in the negotiations between
the two warring parties. In the traditions of realpolitik, Erdogan understands that the West has refrained from
even pointing out the risks of imposing sanctions on Turkey. This incentivizes the Turkish leader to confidently provide Russia with avenues to ease the pressure of trade restrictions and gain access to some of the necessary technology. Turkey is taking every opportunity to increase its geopolitical relevance. By becoming indispensable to the West on various Ukraine-related issues, Turkey gains a kind of immunity to absorb the risks of sanctions. Moscow relies on the partnership with Turkey to adapt to the international isolation with which the West punishes it for the aggression against Ukraine.
Denis Cenusa is an Associated Expert at Think Tank EESC in Lithuania and Moldova, and a PhD candidate at Justus-Liebig- Universität in Germany. He tweets @DionisCenusa
After Bulgaria’s Western-oriented government was toppled in June, the new caretaker government appears committed to undoing many of the steps taken by Sofia earlier this year to distance the country from Moscow, notably with the news that ministers are considering a new gas deal with Gazprom. Montenegro’s government, also pro-Western, faces a similar fate and it’s uncertain who will take over in Podgorica after the anticipated no-confidence vote.
That could result in more countries from the region being