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withdrew their support for the government in protest against the signing of an agreement with the Serbian Orthodox Church in the country.
This could, however, pave the way for the rightwing pro- Russian Democratic Front to return to power as part of a new coalition. The Democratic Front is currently saying it plans
a comeback, proposing a restoration of the ruling coalition that was formed after the August 2020 general election.
The party has a controversial history. Leaders of the Demo- cratic Front were convicted for taking part in the October 2016 coup plot, in which a group of Montenegrins, Russians and Serbians planned to seize control of the country and arrest or assassinate Djukanovic. Their sentences were later overturned following the change of government in 2020.
“Adding to the tensions n the tiny county of just over 620,000 people, there have been multiple reports of death threats against politicians”
Immediately after the invasion of Ukraine in February, the Democratic Front organised protests and road blockades across Montenegro, with protesters waving the flag of the People’s Republic of Donetsk.
Adding to the tensions n the tiny county of just over 620,000 people, there have been multiple reports of death threats against politicians, including Abazovic. Also targeted were the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP), Defence Minister Rasko Konjevic, and fellow SDP MP Draginja Vuksanovic Stankovic. The two, who had opposed the deal with the Serbian Orthodox Church, were the targets of threats on social media to “smash heads” by the Night Wolves –
a biker gang linked to Russian President Vladimir Putin.
Years of soft power
Meanwhile, Serbian President Aleksandar Vucic has consistently made it clear that he will continue with the increasingly difficult job of balancing relations between Russia and the West.
Vucic’s multi-vector foreign policy, under which Serbia seeks good relations with the EU, the US, Russia and China, served it well until 2022, allowing it to pursue the goal of EU accession while at the same time benefitting from Chinese infrastructure and industry investment, as well as from Russian political support in keeping Kosovo out of the UN and other international organisations.
Indeed it is Russia’s support over the Kosovo issue, and the overwhelming public sentiment this creates in favour of Russia, that is the prime factor in keeping Serbia locked into Moscow’s orbit.
The often tense situation in northern Kosovo, populated mainly by ethnic Serbs, escalated at the end of July, parking fears of a potential renewal of the conflict, though the
crisis has now been averted with the leaders of the two countries agreeing to meet later this month. Kosovo’s Prime Minister Albin Kurti said in an interview with Italian daily
La Repubblica published on August 7 that following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the risk of a new conflict between Kosovo and Serbia is high.
Bosnia, meanwhile, remains unable to take a stand against the invasion of Ukraine as long as the staunchly pro-Putin Bosnian Serb leader, Miload Dodik, continues to veto any attempt to do so.
The persistent pull towards the Russian sphere of influence is unsurprising given the years of pro-Russian propaganda and Moscow’s exercise of soft power in the region.
Capucine May, Europe analyst at risk intelligence company Verisk Maplecroft, said in a note emailed to bne IntelliNews that while the situation between Kosovo and Serbia is “unlikely to tip into all-out war”, “Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is adding fuel to the fire of tensions in the Balkans. Moscow’s propaganda disseminated throughout the Balkans by Russian media and disinformation proxies are fanning the flames”. Warnings about Russian propaganda and disinformation in the region have also been repeatedly made by EU officials, among others.
On top of that, there is a high level of energy dependency
on Russia across many countries in the region, which is also home to some of the poorest countries in Europe. Before Gazprom’s supplies were cut off, Bulgaria had long stalled on completing infrastructure to enable alternative imports from Azerbaijan, and under Petkov was scrambling to complete it in time; the new government may take the option of asking Gazprom to renew its supplies. Serbia recently signed a new long-term contract with Gazprom. Bosnia & Herzegovina, Moldova and North Macedonia are also highly dependent
on Russian gas.
As the weeks of war in Ukraine turn into months, it has become apparent that after the initial unity among the EU members and most candidate countries, the long-running internal debates in many states over how to position them- selves vis-a-vis Russia and the West are now reasserting themselves.
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