Page 65 - bne IntelliNews monthly magazine December 2024

bne December 2024
operation” orchestrated to undermine Georgia’s European aspirations. She joined the opposition in condemning GD, accusing the party of “stealing” the vote and Georgia’s future.
International observers including from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) have strongly criticised the vote in Georgia. Their concerns have been echoed by Western politicians such as European Commis- sion President Ursula von der Leyen, who have called for an independent investigation, a concern also raised by 13 indi- vidual EU member states.
Some Western politicians have gone further, echoing Zourabichvili in explicitly blaming Russia for the outcomes of the votes in both countries.
“Russia is waging a hybrid war not only against Poland or the West as a whole. It tried to influence the outcome of the referendum in Moldova with bribery and information aggression, and is now doing the same in Georgia,” wrote Polish Foreign Minister Radek Sikorski on X.
Michael Roth, head of the German Bundestag's Foreign Affairs Committee, also commented on X: “Ukraine is facing a war of annihilation. Moldova is facing a hybrid war. Georgia's free and fair elections are being stolen. Russian imperialism is behind it all. It wants to destroy the young democracies in Eastern Europe.”
“The results align with pre-election polls which predicted that Georgian Dream would win the election and garner the most votes. The ruling party’s victory therefore came as no surprise. What does raise questions is the scale of its success”
Parallel histories
There are some obvious parallels between Moldova and Georgia – both are small post-Soviet countries, and both have part of their territory occupied by Russian-backed separatists (Transnistria in Moldova; Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia).
For both, their post-1991 history has to a large extent been defined by their positioning towards Russia: they are on the new geopolitical frontline between Russia’s influence and the West’s, with their political centres of gravity sporadically shifting from one to the other.
Russia is not just the regional great power, with military and financial clout at its disposal, it has also ensured it has
Opinion 65 long-term leverage over both countries by helping separatist
leaders to take over parts of their territories.
But there are also some clear differences, chiefly in their leadership. While Moldova has made significant strides towards EU accession under the leadership of Sandu, Georgia’s trajectory has been murkier.
Sandu has been a steadfast advocate for EU integration. She achieved EU candidate status for Moldova in 2022 and recently initiated accession negotiations. Her PAS has advanced reforms, further boosting Moldova’s credibility in Brussels.
Meanwhile, Georgia’s ruling party, while publicly supporting EU accession, has taken several steps that have raised doubts about its commitment to democratic values. Under the unofficial influence of founder and billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, the party has sent mixed signals to both the EU and its citizens. Ivanishvili, who made his fortune in Russia, remains a divisive figure whose policies have often seemed more aligned with Russian interests than European ideals.
Despite Georgia’s official position in favour of EU membership, GD has been criticised for its “foreign agents” law, echoing legislation used in Russia to stifle dissent,
and for its anti-LGBTQ initiatives, again similar to Russian legislation that plays on shared Orthodox suspicion of liberal Western views on homosexuality.
These moves have drawn scrutiny from European leaders who see them as backward steps on the path to EU accession. Even though GD hasn’t re-established formal ties with Moscow since the 2008 war, it has taken measures to facilitate closer economic relations, such as accepting the resumption of direct flights and choosing not to support Western sanctions against Russia.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, while Moldovan police and prosectors have investigated and announced the extent of Russia’s interference in the country, the Georgian authorities have shown no interest in probing whether ruling Georgian Dream was helped to victory by Moscow.
Not the whole story
Yet Russian interference in Moldova and alleged vote rigging by Georgian Dream do not tell the whole story.
Commenting on the Georgian election, OSW’s Górecki said: "Three main factors have led to the ruling party’s victory – despite challenges to its legitimacy – and the opposition’s defeat. Firstly, Georgian Dream’s effective propaganda framed pro-Western forces as agents of a ‘global war party’ intending to draw Georgia into a confrontation with Russia. Secondly, the opposition is fragmented and has no prominent leaders. Thirdly, the opposition’s political manifesto failed to reach a broader electorate, including voters from smaller towns and more conservative communities.”
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