Page 125 - Alex Ferguson: My Autobiography
P. 125
Barcelona, as we proved the year before. There is a way to stop them, even Messi. What we did, 12
months previously in the away leg, was to deploy Tévez off the front and Ronaldo at centre-forward,
so we could have two areas of attack. We had the penetration of Ronaldo and Tévez to help us get
hold of the ball.
We still found it hard, of course, because Barcelona monopolised possession for such long periods
and in those circumstances your own players tend to lose interest. They start watching the game: they
are drawn into watching the ball weave its patterns.
Our idea was that when we had any semblance of possession, Ronaldo would go looking for space
and Tévez would come short to get on the ball. But they were busy spectating. I made that point to
them at half-time. ‘You’re watching the game,’ I said. ‘We’re not counter-attacking at all.’ Our
method was not that of Inter Milan; they defended deep and played on the counter-attack throughout.
We were in attack mode in the second half.
A major inhibiting factor in Rome, I will now say, was the choice of hotel. It was a shambles. For
meals we were in a room with no light; the food was late, it was cold. I took a chef there and they
dismissed him, ignored him. On the morning of the game, two or three of our team were feeling a bit
seedy, particularly Giggs. A few were feeling under the weather and one or two played that way. The
role Giggs was assigned came with a high workload that was incompatible with the slight bug in his
system. It was too big a task for him to operate on top of Sergio Busquets, Barcelona’s defensive
midfielder, and then advance as a striker and come back in to cover again.
You would never think about criticising Ryan Giggs, not in any shape or form, after what he
achieved at our club. It was just a pity he was below his normal energy level that night in Rome.
We started the game really well, however, with Ronaldo threatening the Barcelona defence three
times: first, from a dipping free kick, then two shots from distance, which heaped pressure on Victor
Valdés, their goalkeeper. But ten minutes in, we conceded a really awful goal on account of our
midfield’s failure to retreat in time to stop Iniesta making a pass to Samuel Eto’o. Eto’o struck the
shot and Edwin van der Sar didn’t quite deal with it as the ball slipped inside the near post.
Barcelona began with Messi wide right, Eto’o through the middle and Thierry Henry wide left. Just
prior to the goal, they pushed Eto’o wider right and Messi into midfield, as a deep central striker.
They changed Eto’o to the right-hand side because Evra had been breaking away from Messi, early
on. Evra was racing forward persistently and they changed their shape to stop him. Afterwards
Guardiola acknowledged that point. Messi had been moved to save him from having to deal with
Evra.
By making that alteration, Barcelona created a position for Messi he enjoys, in the centre of the
park. That’s where he played from then on, in that hole, which made life hard for the back four
because they were unsure whether to push in against him or stay back and play safe.
After Eto’o’s goal, and with Messi central, Barcelona had an extra man in midfield. Iniesta and
Xavi just went boomp-boomp-boomp, kept possession all night. They were superior to us at ball-
circulation. I won’t waste time contesting that fact.
Conceding the ball to Guardiola’s men came at an awful price because their numerical superiority
in midfield reduced you to a spectating role again. To counteract their passing game, I sent on Tévez
for Anderson at half-time and watched him miss a fine chance when he went round a defender but
decided to beat him a second time, pulling the ball back in and losing it. Barcelona’s clinching goal
came an hour after their first: a header, unusually, by Messi, from a cross by Xavi.
Later I discussed Barcelona’s evolution with Louis van Gaal, their former Dutch coach. The basis
of their philosophy was laid down by Johan Cruyff, a terrific coach who conceived their ideas about