Page 145 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 145 of 237

After detailing the story of Kalman's treachery, the CIA publication, under the headline "Moral of the
Story," asks: "What conclusions can be drawn from the Kalman case?

... One conclusion derives from positive and negative aspects of the Czech performance with respect to
security. Security applies on every echelon of command. There is no place for laxness, even if it may seem
overbureaucratic and ridiculous. The application of security measures has to be executed precisely in every
detail. There is no place for overconfidence in friends and old acquaintances. That Kalman, with his alien
loyalties, came to be trusted with sensitive materials is evidence of such overconfidence."

A discerning CIA reader might come to suspect that, all in all, Intelligence Articles' academic objectivity
leaves something to be desired. Another excerpt worth quoting in this respect is from the magazine's review of a
book * that presented ideas about foreign policy not at all to the liking of the CIA reviewer. For one thing, the
book suggested that the CIA is ineffective.

After noting that the book was written under the pseudonym "John Forth Amory," the equally anonymous
CIA reviewer concludes: "If his identity is worth a search, one might look for a fervent Jeffersonian and F.
D. Rooseveltian who has some bookish knowledge of the United States Government and of big business and
who entertains a particular sympathy for Indonesians, having had opportunities to discuss with them their
philosophy of social change -- a neoacademic sort, probably juvenile or with development arrested at the
simplistic stage, possibly an instructor in some local college course for fledgling foreign service officers."

If the CIA has its cloistered advantages for the scholar at Langley, there are hazards for agents in the field.
Espionage is a dangerous business and some of the CIA's clandestine employees crack under the pressure. (Even
at Langley, there are strains. One deputy director drove himself so hard, he had to be transferred to a less
demanding post overseas.)

Many CIA employees, working irregular hours in odd corners of the globe, suffer from what the agency
itself calls "motivational exhaustion." A CIA report to the House Armed Services Committee in 1963
explained: "This term is used to describe a gradual lessening of interest and enthusiasm of an officer as a
result of impingements on his personal and family life. These stem from the transient nature of his
assignments, the complications and restrictions of security requirements and intrusions on his family life."

The agency has a fairly high rate of suicides, which usually get little attention outside of the Washington
newspapers. In October, 1959, for example, a thirty-two-year-old CIA employee and his wife, just back from a
two-year tour of duty in Germany, jumped into the Potomac River rapids in a suicide pact.

The CIA man, James A. Woodbury, drowned, but his blond wife was pulled out. Police quoted her as saying her
husband had a lot on his mind. "They wanted to put him in a psycho ward," she said, "and we figured it best
to do away with ourselves." The police said Mrs. Woodbury would not elaborate on her reference to "they."

Despite the risks, CIA employees have no job security. Under the 1947 law they can be fired by the director
"in his discretion" with no appeal. In at least one instance, this led to a series of embarrassing disclosures
about the agency's operations and personnel.

On January 30, 1961, Dulles fired a veteran CIA intelligence officer and contact specialist named John Torpats,
who then went into Federal Court seeking reinstatement. Dulles filed an answer urging the case be thrown out. In
the course of it, Dulles stated that "George B. Carey," an assistant director of the CIA, had notified "Emmet
Echols," the director of personnel, that Torpats was allowed to discuss his case with "Ralph Poole" and "Fred
Lott," both assistants to Echols.