Page 218 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 218 of 237

In fact, Seaton talked to Brigadier General Andrew J. Goodpaster, the White House staff secretary and President
Eisenhower's link with the CIA. But there is no indication that Goodpaster checked with Dulles, or that Nixon or
Seaton ever checked with Dulles directly.

Exactly what transpired during Dulles' briefings of Kennedy -- the nuances, the inflections, Dulles' precise words
when the question of Cuba arose -- these will never be known for certain, since the meeting was top-secret and
unrecorded. The same applies to General Cabell's briefing aboard the Caroline November 2.

But there is some evidence that Kennedy did not want to be told about operational matters -- such as the Cuban
invasion -- because of the very fact that this might limit his freedom of action.

In any event, Nixon's dispute with Kennedy and Dulles over who told what to whom missed the point. Regardless
of the content of the CIA briefings, the Kennedy camp had learned informally from other sources that an exile
invasion was hatching.

The candidates for President of the United States were allowing their campaign strategy and public positions to be
influenced by a secret operation of the Invisible Government. (All three major issues debated in the closing days
of the 1960 campaign were related to clandestine operations. First, there was Cuba. Second, there was the issue of
Quemoy and Matsu. Third, the question of whether President Eisenhower should have "apologized" to
Khrushchev after the U-2 flight of Francis Gary Powers in order to save the Paris summit meeting.)

The point is that as a by-product of operations of the Invisible Government the electoral process -- the very
heart of democratic government -- was being confused and diluted.

In the case of the Cuban invasion, both candidates were concerned about a secret plan of which the
electorate knew nothing. In choosing the man to fill the most powerful elective office in the world, the
voters were basing their decision, in part, on misleading statements.

As has been noted, one candidate, Vice-President Nixon, confessed considerably later that he took a false
public position during the campaign, exactly the opposite of his true feeling, in order, he said, to protect the
CIA invasion plan.

But the minions who watched Nixon and Kennedy argue the Cuban issue on television had no way of
knowing that the facts were being distorted or suppressed.

This is not to suggest that the invasion plan should have been announced on nationwide television. But it does
seem reasonable to ask how the voter can make an informed choice when a candidate is not telling the truth, for
whatever laudable patriotic motivation.

Those who argue against tighter controls over the secret branches of the government are fond of making the case
that the American system already has enough built-in safeguards. The people elect a President and place their
faith in him. During his term in the White House, he is free to run the government, including its secret machinery,
as he sees fit. But if the voters dislike how he is running the country, they can turn him out of office in four years.
For during every presidential election campaign, the great issues are debated, there is a full public accounting and
the people can look, listen and make their intelligent choice.

So the argument goes. What happens to this theory, however, when the electoral process becomes so
enmeshed in the tentacles of the Invisible Government that a candidate tells the voters he stands for one
course of action, when he really believes just the opposite? Obviously, the electoral process itself is