Page 223 - Gobierno ivisible

Date: 4/5/2011 Page: 223 of 237

Special operations should be launched only after the most sober deliberation by the President, acting upon the
broadest possible advice. This counsel should come not only from those within the intelligence community, but
from responsible officials with a wider viewpoint. Operations such as those at the Bay of Pigs and in
Indonesia involved the potential overthrow of a foreign government. They amount to undeclared war. They
should be launched only when the alternative of inaction carries with it the gravest risk to national
security.

If, nonetheless, it becomes necessary to undertake a secret operation, it is imperative that the long- range
repercussions be weighed fully in advance. The consequences of failure must be faced. Was it worth running the
risk of national humiliation in attempting to overthrow Castro? Was it worth running the risk of permanently
alienating Sukarno by supporting his enemies?

Equal consideration must be given to the problems that would result from the success of a special
operation. Is the United States prepared to assume responsibility for the economic and political conditions
growing out of a successful CIA-supported revolt? How much is really accomplished, in such cases as
Guatemala and Iran, if a pro-Communist government is removed, but the conditions which permitted
Communism to make inroads in the first place are restored?

It is a delusion to think that the problems of United States foreign policy in a complex world can be
resolved by the quick surgery of a palace coup. The intelligence and espionage technicians, who have a
natural affinity for such activist solutions, should never be allowed to dominate the deliberations leading to
secret operations. Nor should they be permitted exclusive control of the conduct of operations in the field.

Both Eisenhower and Kennedy directed that the ambassador be in charge of all United States activities in a
foreign country. It is essential that this theoretical supremacy become a reality. An ambassador should never
be put in the position of a William Sebald in Burma. If he is to maintain the respect of the government leaders
with whom he is dealing, he must be kept informed about American clandestine activity. If circumstances dictate
a covert policy that conflicts with the avowed policy of Washington toward a given country, the ambassador must
know about it.

Congress should also be kept informed. Under the Constitution, Congress is supposed to act as a check
upon the activities of the executive branch. Traditionally, the Senate has given its "advice and consent" to
major commitments in the sphere of foreign affairs. But in its relations with the Invisible Government,
Congress has all but voted away its rights. It knows relatively little about what goes on in the $4,000,000,000-
a-year intelligence complex for which it appropriates the money.

The CIA subcommittees in the House and Senate are controlled by the most conservative elements in
Congress, men who are close personally and philosophically to those who run the Invisible Government.
These subcommittees are now heavily weighted with legislators whose field of competence is military
affairs. They should be reorganized to encompass men with a wider view and expert knowledge of foreign
affairs. Men such as Senator Fulbright (who foresaw the perils of the Bay of Pigs with such clarity) should
not be purposely excluded from Congressional surveillance of the intelligence apparatus.

The shadowy subcommittees should be replaced by a joint committee, including men from both the House and
Senate. There is no reason why secrets should leak in any greater degree from one formal committee than from
the present group of informal subcommittees. There has not been any leak of classified data from the Joint
Committee on Atomic Energy.

Although the need for greater Congressional control is apparent, both President Eisenhower and President
Kennedy resisted it as an infringement upon their executive power. They established a veneer of outside