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however, lays down that the onus of proof in respect of the other two elements
rests upon the defendant, provided that the first two elements have been

established by the prosecution.

Indeed the point to grasp in the judgment of Lord Goddard is that in such cases

the onus of proof upon the defendant may be two-fold resting both upon statute
and upon general principles. First, if it is proved by the prosecution that the

defendant knowingly harboured goods subject to duty, section 259 of the Act

(section 124 of the Ordinance) throws upon him the onus of proving that the
goods are in fact customed. This may be termed the statutory onus.

Next, 'the prosecution having proved that the defendant was in possession of

dutiable goods in such circumstances as would entitle a court to find that he was
consciously in possession of them and the accused having failed to prove that the

duty had in fact been paid, there is then an onus on him to give some explanation

of his possession from which a jury might infer that he did not know that the duty
had not been paid. That it must be for him to give this explanation is because the

facts relating thereto must be exclusively in his knowledge. There is, in fact, a
shifting of the burden of proof, and in considering the amount of evidence

necessary to shift the burden of proof the court has regard to the opportunities of

knowledge with respect to the facts to be proved which may be possessed by the
parties respectively.”

Notably, the decisions in Carlos Renwick and Norman Lainfiesta are consistent with each other

where the reference to “dutiable goods” in Norman Lainfiesta and the absence of said reference

in Carlos Renwick may be attributed to the fact that in Trinidad and Tobago the definition of
“uncustomed goods” is wider and also covers “any goods, whether liable to duty or not, that are
38
imported or exported or in any way dealt with contrary to any customs enactment.”

For those jurisdictions that have adopted section 170(1)(b), Lord Goddard’s statement, at page

38 See Section 2 of the Customs Act

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