Page 35 - TPA - A Peace Officer's Guide to Texas Law 2015

complex at night with its lights on and engine running; 2) parked his police vehicle at an angle that at least
partially blocked appellant's egress but did not prevent him from "maneuvering" around the officer and driving
away; 3) shined his police vehicle's spotlight inside appellant's car; 4) did not activate his siren or emergency
lights or use a bullhorn or loudspeaker to communicate with appellant; 5) approached appellant's car and asked,
"What's going on, what are you doing out here?" and requested appellant's identification; and 6) did not carry a
flashlight, draw a weapon, order appellant to put his hands up, or otherwise inform appellant that he was being
detained. We disagree, however, with the appellate court's determination that appellant was not detained. We
cannot conclude that, under the totality of the circumstances in this case, a reasonable person would have felt free
to leave; thus, this case involved a detention rather than a consensual encounter.

An investigative detention, which implicates Fourth Amendment protections, "occurs when a person
yields to the police officer's show of authority under a reasonable belief that he is not free to leave." Crain v.
State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). In determining whether the interaction constituted an
encounter or a detention, courts focus on whether the officer conveyed a message that compliance with the
officer's request was required "whether a reasonable person in the citizen's position would have felt free to
decline the officer's requests or otherwise terminate the encounter." Id. We conclude that, under the totality of
circumstances in the instant case, a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave or decline the officer's
requests.

The Court of Criminal Appeals ruled that a detention had occurred and remanded the case to the court of
appeals to determine whether the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion.
th
Johnson v. State, No. PD-0202-12 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. Dec. 11 , 2013).

FOURTH AMENDMENT TRAFFIC STOP REASONABLE SUSPICION from ANNONYMOUS
TIPS.

A California Highway Patrol officer stopped the pickup truck occupied by petitioners because it matched
the description of a vehicle that a 911 caller had recently reported as having run her off the road. As he and a
second officer approached the truck, they smelled marijuana. They searched the trucks bed, found 30 pounds of
marijuana, and arrested petitioners. Petitioners moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the traffic stop
violated the Fourth Amendment. Their motion was denied, and they pleaded guilty to transporting marijuana. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an
investigative stop.

Held: The traffic stop complied with the Fourth Amendment because, under the totality of the circumstances,
the officer had reasonable suspicion that the trucks driver was intoxicated.

The Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops such as the traffic stop in this case when a law
enforcement officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity. United States v. Cortez, 449 U. S. 411, 417 418 (1981); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1,
2122 (1968). The reasonable suspicion necessary to justify such a stop is dependent upon both the content
of information possessed by police and its degree of reliability. Alabama v. White, 496 U. S. 325, 330 (1990).
The standard takes into account the totality of the circumstances the whole picture. Cortez, supra, at 417.
Although a mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, Terry, supra, at 27, the level of suspicion the
standard requires is considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and
obviously less than is necessary for probable cause, United States v. Sokolow, 490 U. S. 1, 7 (1989).

These principles apply with full force to investigative stops based on information from anonymous tips.

Of course, an anonymous tip alone seldom demonstrates the informants basis of knowledge or
veracity. White, 496 U. S., at 329 (emphasis added). That is because ordinary citizens generally do not provide
extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations, and an anonymous tipster s veracity is by

A Peace Officer’s Guide to Texas Law 28 2015 Edition